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Abstract
Three Essays on Mortgage Default
Hrishikesh Singhania
This dissertation consists of three essays on mortgage default. The first essay
discusses the determinants of mortgage default. The financial crisis of 2007-2008
was precipitated by default in subprime mortgages. This episode spurred a lot
of research on mortgage default. The essay surveys this research with a focus on
what determines mortgage default. It emphasizes that the market value of home
equity determines default, not the book value of equity.
The second essay discusses the valuation of mortgage backed securities in an
equilibrium framework that explicitly incorporates default decisions of homeown-
ers, along with essential contractual features of these securities. The analysis
begins by valuing Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs), which are secu-
rities created by dividing a pool of mortgages into senior and residual tranches.
A major finding is that bonds issued on the senior tranche can be risk free, low
risk, or high risk in equilibrium, depending on the relative size of the tranche. For
house price data from the Case-Shiller house price index between 2006 and 2011,
model implied senior bond values decline by 10% and residual bond values de-
cline by 60%. The essay also discusses the valuation of CMO-squared and Credit
Default Swaps, which are both derivative securities created from CMOs.
The third essay discusses valuation of mortgages with coupon resets, when
homeowners optimally exercise the option to default on their mortgage. The
analysis shows that the optimal default boundary is discontinuous at the reset
ix
date when the coupon after the reset is large, compared to the coupon prior to the
reset. The model connects equilibrium yield spreads on these mortgages to initial
loan-to-value ratios, coupon structure, time remaining until the reset, expected
growth rate in house prices, and the volatility of house prices. Conditional on the
initial loan-to-value ratio, mortgages with low initial payments followed by high
payments after the reset have higher default risk than the corresponding fixed rate
mortgage. The essay also discusses the valuation of balloon payment mortgages.
x
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Chapter 1
A Survey of the Determinants of
Mortgage Default
1.1 Introduction
Individuals in the United States usually finance home purchases using mort-
gage loans. A mortgage loan transaction involves a homeowner (borrower) making
an initial payment towards the purchase of the property, while a bank (lender)
supplies the remaining funds. The borrower pays off the loan over time by making
regular coupon payments, which are applied towards principal and interest on the
loan. At any time during the life of the loan, the borrower can prepay his mort-
gage by paying off the remaining loan balance. Alternatively, he can stop paying
the coupon and default on his mortgage. Since mortgage loans are collateralized
by the underlying property, the ownership of the property is transferred to the
lender if the borrower defaults.
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Understanding the borrower’s incentives to exercise the default option is im-
portant for lenders in order to price the mortgages correctly, and to manage the
risk of their mortgage portfolios. It is important for policy makers because mort-
gage default may affect the broader economy. The wider consequences of mortgage
default were apparent in the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, in which default
in the subprime segment of the U.S. housing market triggered the worst recession
since the Great Depression. The unanticipated increase in mortgage defaults has
raised a lot of questions regarding mortgage defaults. What drives borrowers to
default? What role did subprime mortgages play in the crisis? What was the
role of “exotic” mortgages in the crisis? Did lenders make unaffordable mortgage
loans in the buildup to the crisis? If so, why? How does securitization of mort-
gages affect default? How do foreclosures affect local house prices? Are mortgage
modification programs effective in reducing foreclosures? In response, research in
this area has expanded rapidly. This paper provides a survey of recent research
on the question: What determines mortgage default?1
Mortgage market analysts usually classify default into “strategic” and “non-
strategic” default. Mortgage default is considered strategic if the borrower stops
paying the coupon on his mortgage, even though he has the financial resources
to do so. For example, a borrower might default strategically if the outstanding
balance on his mortgage significantly exceeds the value of the underlying property.
Default is non-strategic or involuntary if the borrower stops paying the coupon
on his mortgage because he does not have the financial resources to make the
payment due to adverse life events. For example, an unemployed borrower who is
1Quercia and Stegman (1992) provides a survey of early research on determinants of mortgage
default.
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underwater on his mortgage, has no savings, and is currently credit constrained.
Involuntary default is often called the “double trigger” theory of mortgage default
because default is induced by two triggers: negative book equity and an adverse
life event.
Following the terminology in the literature on mortgage default, this survey
is organized loosely into studies that focus on strategic versus non-strategic de-
fault. I classify studies that primarily focus on the role of home equity in default
under strategic default. This method of classification results in a large number
of studies on the determinants of mortgage default falling under the category of
strategic default. Therefore the bulk of this paper, Sections 1.2 to 1.9, focuses on
strategic default, while Section 1.10 is devoted to non-strategic default. Section
1.2 presents a simple model of strategic default. This section shows the theoretical
relationship between strategic default, economic value of home equity, and book
value of home equity. The connection between strategic default and book value
of equity is important because empirical studies use book equity as the measure
of home equity; economic equity is unobservable. Section 1.3 discusses empirical
studies that focus on the importance of negative book equity as a determinant
of default. Section 1.4 discusses estimates of the levels of book equity at which
defaults occur in the data. Section 1.5 presents evidence on how payment size
affects mortgage default. Section 1.6 connects mortgage yields at origination to
mortgage default. Section 1.7 shows what survey data reveal about moral and
social attitudes towards strategic default. Section 1.8 discusses default in second
mortgage liens. Section 1.9 shows how lender recourse impacts mortgage default.
3
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Section 1.10 focuses on studies that emphasize the role of adverse life events on
default. Section 1.11 concludes.
1.2 A Simple Model of Mortgage Default
Studies that model strategic default adapt the classic paper of Merton (1974)
to the mortgage market. The primary insight from these studies is that default
is optimal only when a borrower is significantly underwater on his mortgage.
(A borrower is underwater on his mortgage when the value of the underlying
property minus the mortgage balance — the book value of equity — is negative.)
The studies emphasize that the economic value of home equity matters for the
default decision. In Section 1.2.3 I relate the economic value of equity at the time
of default to the book value of equity. This relationship is implicit in models
of mortgage default. I present it explicitly because it tightens the connection
between theoretical and empirical work on mortgage default; empirical work in
this area uses book equity because it is easily measured. Kau, Keenan, and
Kim (1994) is an early paper that studies strategic default and its implications.
Vandell (1995) provides an overview of the early literature on strategic default.
This section presents a simple model of strategic mortgage default in fixed rate
mortgages (FRMs); see Krainer, LeRoy, and O (2009) for a recent exposition. The
exposition here draws heavily upon Singhania (2013).
4
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1.2.1 Model Setup
A house provides a stochastic flow of services. Housing services x(t) are ex-
ogenous and follow a geometric Brownian motion:
dx(t) = αx(t)dt+ σx(t)dw(t), (1.1)
where α is the expected proportional growth rate, σ is the volatility parameter,
and w(t) is standard Brownian motion. Initial housing services are normalized to
one, x(0) = 1.
House prices are the expected discounted value of future services:
P (x(t)) ≡
∫ ∞
z=t
e−ρ(z−t)Et
(
x(z)
)
dz =
x(t)
ρ− α . (1.2)
The operator Et denotes the mathematical expectation conditional on information
available at time t. The discount rate ρ is exogenous and constant. House prices
can be represented by (1.2) if housing services follow a geometric Brownian motion
under the risk neutral probability measure or if agents are risk neutral. This
specification of house prices rules out bubbles. By (1.2), house prices also follow
a geometric Brownian motion, with α as the expected proportional growth rate
and σ as the volatility parameter. Since geometric Brownian motion is a Markov
process, the current house price summarizes relevant past and future information.
The best forecast for house prices is that they grow at the rate α.
Under the normalization x(0) = 1, the purchase price of the house is P (1) =
1/(ρ−α). An infinitely lived risk neutral borrower buys the house using a mortgage
5
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loan. The difference in the size of the mortgage loan and the purchase price is
financed from the borrower’s personal wealth, which is not modeled. The mortgage
contract requires the borrower to make perpetual coupon payments to the lender
in exchange for the flow of services from the property. The coupon c is exogenous.
The modeling assumption that mortgages are perpetuities does not lead to major
distortions because, in practice, most mortgage defaults occur within the first few
years of origination, when mortgage payments are mostly interest payments. The
borrower has the option to default on his mortgage, subject to a cost, at any time
by paying the lender the current market value of the house. This assumption
allows the market value of the house at the time of default to be less than the size
of the mortgage loan. The assumption corresponds in reality to the ability of the
borrower to turn over the keys and walk away from the house.
In practice, borrowers who choose to default have to bear relocation expenses,
loss of future credit access, and loss of tax benefits. These costs are incorporated
into the model by assuming that borrowers faces positive default costs. The
existence of mortgages with initial loan-to-value (LTV) ratios greater than 100%
in practice provides further evidence in favor of positive borrower default costs.
Research has also shown that default behavior observed in the data is difficult
to reconcile with the behavior implied by a model of costless default; see Deng,
Quigley, and Van Order (2000). Default costs, however, need not be positive for all
borrowers. The popular press has reported instances of borrowers living rent free
in their houses after defaulting on their mortgage. Such cases are incorporated
into the analysis by allowing borrower default costs to be negative. Borrower
6
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default costs are denoted kb. These costs are exogenous and proportional to the
purchase price of the property.
Default is also costly for lenders. Once borrowers default, lenders gain posses-
sion of the property. The cost of maintaining, repairing, and reselling the property
is borne by lenders. Usually there is a lag, of a year or more, between the default
date and the date at which lenders can repossess and sell the property. During this
lag, lenders also lose income from coupon payments. These costs are modeled as
lender default costs, denoted k`. Lender default costs are exogenous, proportional
to the purchase price of the property, and identical across mortgages. Default
costs paid by borrowers and lenders are deadweight loss to the society. This mod-
eling choice is motivated by the notion that mortgage default is inefficient, rather
than a costless transfer of ownership of the property from the borrower back to
the lender.
Borrowers are prohibited from prepaying their mortgage. Thus credit risk is
the only risk faced by lenders. The mortgage market features free entry and exit,
implying that lenders make zero expected profits. Under zero expected profits, the
size of the mortgage loan must equal the expected discounted value of borrowers’
payments. The latter depends upon the default behavior of the borrower. There-
fore the size of the loan is determined as part of the equilibrium. Consequently
the initial LTV ratio and the mortgage yield are also determined in equilibrium.
1.2.2 Equilibrium
The borrower chooses the threshold of housing services at which to default
so as to maximize home equity, or equivalently minimize mortgage liability. The
7
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solution to this problem presented here employs boundary crossing properties of
geometric Brownian motion. This method reduces the valuation of home equity
to a simple present value calculation. Alternatively, one could use dynamic pro-
gramming; see Krainer, LeRoy, and O (2009) for this approach.
The home equity maximization problem at origination is
max
d
{
P (1)− E0
[ ∫ τ(d)
0
c e−ρtdt
]
− E0
[
e−ρτ(d)
(
P (d) + kb
)]}
, (1.3)
where d denotes a generic default threshold and τ(d) denotes the time at which
housing services hit the default threshold. The time of default is random because
housing services are random. All mathematical expectations in the maximization
problem above are conditional on information available at origination. The ran-
dom variable in all the expectations above is the default time τ(d). The term
inside the first expectation is the total discounted present value of the coupons
paid by the borrower until default. The term inside the second expectation is the
discounted present value of the borrower’s payments on default: the market value
of the house P (d), and default costs kb. Home equity equals house price minus
the expected discounted value of all mortgage payments.
The objective function in (1.3) can be simplified by noting that c, P (d), and
kb can be moved out of the expectation. After evaluating the integral within the
first expectation, the problem in (1.3) becomes
P (1)− c
ρ
+ max
d
{
E0
[
e−ρτ(d)
](
c
ρ
− P (d)− kb
) }
. (1.4)
8
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Calculating the mathematical expectation of e−ρτ(d) at origination is the key to
solving the equity maximization problem. This expectation is the moment gen-
erating function of the random default time τ(d) evaluated at −ρ. It equals dm,
where m > 0 depends on the parameters of the process followed by housing ser-
vices and the discount rate ρ
m =
(α− σ2/2) +
√(
α− σ2/2)2 + 2ρσ2
σ2
. (1.5)
By the strong Markov property of geometric Brownian motion, the moment gener-
ating function of τ(d) conditional on information available at time t is (d/x(t))m;
see Karatzas and Shreve (1991) for a discussion.
After substituting for E0[e−ρτ(d)], home equity is a function only of the de-
fault threshold d. Standard optimization techniques apply. The optimal default
threshold is
δ =
(
m
m+ 1
)(
c/ρ− kb
P (1)
)
. (1.6)
The optimal threshold is strictly increasing in the mortgage coupon c, and strictly
decreasing in borrower default costs kb. The borrower defaults when x(t) = δ for
the first time. From here on I drop the word optimal and refer to δ as the default
threshold. I also suppress the dependence of the optimal default time on δ and
indicate the default time by τ .
9
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Let E(x(t)) denote the value function of the equity maximization problem.
The expression for home equity is
E(x(t)) = P (x(t))− c
ρ
+
(
c
ρ
− P (δ)− kb
)(
δ
x(t)
)m
(1.7)
Home equity equals the current house price minus the present value of mortgage
coupon payments plus an adjustment for default. The adjustment reflects the
fact that on defaulting the borrower gains the present value of remaining coupon
payments c/ρ, loses the house worth P (δ), and pays the default cost kb. When
x(t) = δ home equity equals −kb, or equivalently E(x(t)) + kb = 0. The economic
value of borrower’s equity, not the book value of equity, is zero at the optimal
default threshold. This finding has important implications for empirical work on
mortgage default. These implications will be discussed in Section 1.2.3.
Let M(x(t)) denote the value of the mortgage to the lender when housing
services equal x(t). The zero expected profit condition implies that M(x(t)) equals
the expected discounted value of the borrower’s payments,
M(x(t)) =
c
ρ
−
(
c
ρ
+ k` − P (δ)
)(
δ
x(t)
)m
. (1.8)
The first term on the right hand side of (1.8) is the value of the mortgage in the
absence of default. The second term is the adjustment for default. On default,
the lender loses all future coupon payments c/ρ, pays the default cost k`, and
gains the market value of the house at the time of default P (δ). The value of
the mortgage at origination is M(1). The equilibrium asset value of the mortgage
is increasing in housing services x(t) because default in the near future becomes
10
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less likely as x(t) increases. As x(t) approaches infinity, the value of the mortgage
approaches c/ρ. At the default threshold δ, the value of the mortgage equals the
net recovery, M(δ) = P (δ)− k`.
The zero expected profit condition also implies that the size of the mortgage
loan equals M(1). Therefore the initial LTV ratio is M(1)/P (1). The initial yield
on the mortgage is c/M(1). The difference between the initial yield and ρ — the
yield spread — reflects the expected loss due to mortgage default. The recovery
rate on the mortgage is M(δ)/M(1).
1.2.3 Discussion
In the model presented above the borrower always has enough financial re-
sources to pay the coupon. Therefore default is strategic. Why does the borrower
default? The borrower defaults in order to maximize his wealth. A mortgage in
the model is a financial security that provides the borrower with a stochastic div-
idend flow x(t) in exchange for the coupon c. The security comes with an option
that allows the borrower to free himself from the debt obligation by relinquishing
his claim to the dividend flow, and by paying kb. It is optimal for the borrower
to exercise this option when the dividend flow reaches the level at which the net
present value of the security is zero. Conversely the borrower holds the security
as long as its net present value is positive. The real options literature provides
many other examples of such net present value calculations; see Dixit and Pindyck
(1994) for an overview.
Certain analysts of mortgage default purport that when the exercise of the
default option is costless, kb = 0, a borrower who wants to maximize his wealth
11
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should default as soon as the book value of equity is zero. After defaulting the bor-
rower could take out another mortgage to repurchase the house at the lower price,
thereby increasing his wealth. According to this view, borrowers with positive
default costs should wait until the sum of the book value of equity and kbequals
zero. Analysts that hold this view measure borrower default costs in the data as
the amount by which the book value of equity is below zero at the time of default.
This view of default, and so the measurement methodology, is in error because
the book value of equity does not incorporate the value of the default option. The
optimal default rule is characterized by the economic value of equity being zero,
not book equity.
It is interesting to compare the zero book equity default rule to the optimal
default rule according to the model presented here. I compare the two default
rules using numerical examples. The parametrization is from Krainer, LeRoy,
and O (2009). The discount rate is ρ = 7%, implying that the average real
proportional gain on mortgages and home equity is 7%. The parameters for
the geometric Brownian motion followed by housing services are α = 3%, and
σ = 15%. Under the normalization x(0) = 1, the purchase price of a house is
P (1) = 25. The implied price-to-rent ratio in the model is 25.2 The chosen
value of σ = 15% for the standard deviation of housing services is consistent with
estimates of individual house price volatility in the literature.3 Lender default
2Price-to-rent ratios in the data are closer to 10 or 15. This discrepancy between the model
and the data is appropriate because the model abstracts from operating costs such as main-
tainence and utilities expenses.
3For example, Flavin and Yamashita (2002) estimated the standard deviation of the real
return on housing to be 14%. Similarly, Case and Shiller (1989) estimated the return on in-
dividual houses to be around 14-15%. Values of σ closer to 10% maybe more appropriate for
houses located in certain geographical areas of the United States.
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costs are zero. The numerical examples will vary the mortgage coupon c and
borrower default costs kb.
Figure 1.1 shows the optimal default threshold as a function of initial LTV, for
borrower default costs ranging from zero to forty percent of the purchase price.
The initial LTV ratio was varied by changing the mortgage coupon c. To allow
comparison with the zero book equity default rule, the optimal default threshold is
expressed in terms of the corresponding book value of equity normalized by house
price at time of default. In the model the book value of equity at the time of default
is given by P (δ) −M(1); recall that mortgages are modeled as perpetuities and
M(1) is the size of the mortgage loan. The book value of equity is normalized
by the current house price to maintain consistency with empirical literature on
mortgage default. Therefore the vertical axis in Figure 1.1 corresponds in the
model to (
P (δ)−M(1)
P (δ)
)
× 100. (1.9)
The figure highlights that rational borrowers wait to default until they are
significantly underwater on their mortgage, as measured by book equity. For
example, a borrower with kb = 0 who has a mortgage with an initial LTV of
80% defaults when normalized book value of equity is -22%, not when normalized
book equity is zero. As noted earlier, the key reason for the difference is that the
zero book equity default rule fails to account for the value of the default option;
the option becomes more valuable as house prices decline. The zero book equity
default rule and the optimal default rule are identical only when borrower default
costs are zero and the initial LTV ratio is 100%.
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Figure 1.1: Default thresholds as a function of initial LTV ratio when borrowers
default strategically on their fixed rate mortgage. The thresholds are expressed in
terms of book equity normalized by the house price at the time of default. Default
thresholds are shown for various values of borrower default costs, expressed as a
percentage of the purchase price. Lender default costs are set to zero. The solid
black dot corresponds to the value of default threshold estimated by Bhutta,
Dokko, and Shan (2010).
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1.3 Negative Book Equity
Figure 1.1 is useful for understanding and interpreting empirical work on mort-
gage default because empirical studies measure borrowers’ home equity using the
book value of equity. The figure shows that, according the model of section 1.2,
default is optimal only for borrowers who are significantly underwater, as mea-
sured by the book value of equity. This implication of the model has been tested
in the empirical literature as the hypothesis that being underwater is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition for default. The necessity of negative book value of
equity follows from the fact that a borrower with positive book equity who wants
to terminate the mortgage would prefer to sell the house, pay back the mortgage
loan, and pocket the difference.
An empirical study by Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008a) confirms that a
majority of borrowers with negative book equity do not default on their mortgages.
The authors use an extensive dataset compiled from the Massachussetts Registry
of Deeds by the Warren Group. The dataset contains information about every
house purchase and mortgage origination in the state of Massachussetts from 1987
to 2007, including the purchase price of each house, the size of the mortgage loan,
and information on additional liens.
In order to estimate the current value of book equity for a borrower, the authors
require an estimate of the current house price and the outstanding mortgage
balance. The authors estimate individual house prices using methodology that is
standard in the empirical mortgage default literature. Starting from the purchase
price, they assume that the property appreciates at the same rate as a house price
15
Chapter 1. A Survey of the Determinants of Mortgage Default
index for the relevant geographical area. Papers in the literature usually calculate
the growth rate of house prices using the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)
county level house price index or the Case-Shiller MSA level house price index.
The Massachussetts Registry of Deeds, however, is unique in that it tracks the
price of each property over time. Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008a) exploit
this feature and construct local house price indexes for various cities and towns
using the Case-Shiller repeat sales methodology. The advantage of this approach
is that it allows them to obtain house price estimates that are relatively more
precise. Estimates of the outstanding mortgage balance are unavailable to the
authors because the dataset does not contain information on mortgage coupon
rates. Therefore the authors calculate the current value of book equity as the
current house price minus the size of the mortgage loan, normalized by the loan
size. Note that book equity is normalized by house price at the time of default on
the vertical axis of Figure 1.1. Normalizing book equity by the size of the mortgage
loan instead would raise the scale on the vertical axis because P (δ) < M(1).
The estimate of book equity employed by Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008a)
implies that 100,288 borrowers who had purchased their house after the first quar-
ter of 1987 were underwater on their mortgages by the fourth quarter of 1991.
Only 6.4 percent of these borrowers defaulted in the subsequent three years.4 The
fact that only a small fraction of mortgages with negative book equity default
questions its relevance in driving default in the data, among the proponents of
the zero book equity default rule.
4In the study by Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008a), a mortgage defaults once the lender
initiates foreclosure proceedings. Other papers in the literature define mortgage default as the
borrower being 60+ or 90+ days delinquent.
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Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008a) estimate the effect of negative book equity
on default using a statistical duration model. The model characterizes hazard
functions, which are the probabilities that a borrower living in a particular house
with certain mortgage characteristics will terminate his mortgage t quarters from
the origination date, conditional on not having terminated it already. Accord-
ing to the empirical model, mortgages can be terminated either by default or by
sale of the underlying property. Therefore the model has two hazard functions.
The model features a proportional hazard specification, meaning that each haz-
ard function has a baseline hazard and independent variables have a proportional
effect on the baseline. The hazard functions depend on borrower characteristics,
mortgage characteristics, and local economic conditions. The independent vari-
ables include the borrower’s book equity, town level unemployment rates, the con-
temporaneous six month LIBOR, median household income at the zipcode level,
fraction of minorites in the zipcode, property type, and subprime status.5 In the
empirical specification, book equity is modeled as a linear spline with seven inter-
vals: (−∞,−20%), [−20%,−10%], [−10%, 0%], [0, 10%], [10%, 25%), [25%,∞).
The linear spline specification captures the effect of negative book equity on the
default hazard flexibly, by allowing book equity to have different slopes in each
interval. This specification is common among papers that estimate the effect of
negative book equity on default; see for example Deng, Quigley, and Van Order
(2000) and Pennington-Cross and Ho (2010).
5Town level unemployment rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. LIBOR stands for
the London InterBank Offered Rate. Coupon payments on adjustable-rate mortgages are usually
indexed to LIBOR. Median household income at the zipcode level and fraction of minorities in
a zipcode are obtained from the 2000 Census.
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In contrast to the implication of the zero book equity default rule, the authors
find that negative book equity is an important determinant of the default hazard.
The baseline hazard function gives the probability of default when all variables are
evaluated at their sample means and the initial LTV is set to 80%. The estimates
show that a borrower with book equity between -10% and 0% is approximately 3
times more likely to default than the baseline borrower. The default hazard rises
as book equity drops: borrowers with book equity less than -20% are 5 times more
likely to default than the baseline.
The effects of other independent variables on the baseline default hazard are
intuitive. The default hazard is increases with LIBOR, and with town level un-
employment rate. Subprime borrowers have higher default hazards than prime
borrowers.6 Borrowers in single-family homes have lower default hazards than
borrowers in condominiums and multi-family properties. The default hazard is
higher for borrowers who live in zipcodes with lower median incomes, and for
those who live in zipcodes with a larger fraction of minorities. These findings are
consistent with other empirical studies on mortgage default.
While the previous study focuses primarily on negative book equity, the study
by Bajari et. al. (2008) analyzes how default is affected by four factors — current
house prices, expectations of future house prices, contract interest rates relative
to market interest rates, and liquidity constraints — in a unified framework. In
their empirical framework, default is induced either by financial incentives or by
the inability of a borrower to pay his mortgage coupon. The financial incentives
for default depend on the current value-to-loan ratio; the present value of the
6Homeowners who borrow from subprime lenders are labeled subprime borrowers.
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remaining payments computed using the market interest rate minus the present
value computed using the mortgage interest rate; months remaining until a pay-
ment reset; and interactions of the value-to-loan ratio with the expectation and
variance of future house price growth. In the benchmark specification borrowers
expect house prices next period to grow at same rate as house prices in the cur-
rent period. The authors consider two other specifications. In the first, borrowers
have perfect foresight about house prices one period into the future. In the second,
borrowers’ house price expectations are imputed from the user cost of housing;
see Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) for a discussion of user costs.
A borrower’s ability to pay his mortgage coupon depends on the borrower’s
payment-to-income (PI) ratio; a vector of variables that are likely to covary with
the borrower’s budget and credit constraints (FICO score, employment status,
other assets, presence of other liens, initial LTV, level of income documentation
during mortgage origination); and the interaction between the PI ratio and the
covariates. The empirical setup estimates the role of each factor in mortgage
default. Since the econometrician cannot observe whether financial incentives or
the inability to pay led the borrower to default, the authors model the default
decision as a bivariate probit model with partial observability.
Bajari, Chu, and Park (2008) use LoanPerformance data, a division of First
American CoreLogic, on mortgages originated between 2000 and 2007. The
dataset only covers securitized subprime and Alt-A mortgages. The authors focus
on first liens of fixed and adjustable-rate mortgages only. They supplement Loan-
Performance data with house price data from the Case-Shiller house price index
at the level of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). Loan level data are also
19
Chapter 1. A Survey of the Determinants of Mortgage Default
matched with data from the 2000 Census to control for demographic characteris-
tics at the zipcode level. County level monthly unemployment rates reported by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are used as proxies for individual employ-
ment status.
The authors find that a one standard deviation increase in the value-to-loan
ratio decreases the default hazard by 7.55%, after controlling for house price ex-
pectations, volatility, and MSA and year fixed effects. A one standard deviation
increase in the monthly PI ratio increases the default hazard by 17.15%. This
effect is stronger for households with FICO scores less than 700; borrowing con-
straints are more likely to bind for these households. Low documentation on a
mortgage loan increases the probability of default by 40%. A second lien on a
mortgage increases the probability of default by 125%. A one standard deviation
increase in FICO scores decreases the default hazard by 77%. A one standard
deviation increase in initial LTV and in the county unemployment rate increases
the default hazard by 21% and 10%, respectively. A borrower who expects house
prices to appreciate at a rate of 10% above the sample average has a default haz-
ard 4.22% lower than his counterpart in the average housing market. Surprisingly,
borrowers are more likely to default when the forward looking and user cost mea-
sures suggest strong house price appreciation. The authors conclude that these
two measures are ill-suited for measuring borrowers’ expectations of house price
growth. The interaction term between housing market volatility and the value-
to-loan ratio is also significant: a one standard deviation increase in the volatility
at the average value-to-loan ratio lowers the default hazard by 2.77%.
20
Chapter 1. A Survey of the Determinants of Mortgage Default
The authors also compare the relative contribution of each factor to the dif-
ferential default performances of various vintages. They ask: how much of the
increase in the default rate of the 2006 vintage, relative to the 2004 vintage, can be
attributed to changes in its observable characteristics? The findings suggest that
the large decrease in house prices coupled with declining credit quality account for
the higher default rate of the 2006 vintage.7 Declining home equity increases the
default hazard for the 2006 vintage, relative to the 2004 vintage, by 56%; lower
FICO scores in the 2006 vintage increase the relative default hazard by 70%; lower
expectations of house price growth increase the relative default hazard by 40%.
1.4 Default Thresholds
Recent work by Bhutta, Dokko, and Shan (2010) estimates default thresholds
in mortgage data directly. In their study, a borrower is said to default when he is
90+ days delinquent for more than two months. The time of default is defined to
be 3 months prior to the month of 90+ day delinquency. The default threshold is
the book equity normalized by the house price, see (1.9), at the time of default.
The authors find that the median borrower defaults strategically when normalized
book equity equals −62%. The study uses data from LoanPerformance. The
authors focus on first liens of purchase nonprime mortgages with combined loan-
to-value (CLTV) ratios of 100%, originated in 2006 in Arizona, California, Florida
and Nevada.
7Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2009) and Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) come to a similar
conclusion.
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The study employs a two-step maximum likelihood procedure that accounts
for censoring in the sample; 22% of the sample does not default. The two-step
procedure allows separation of defaults that are caused by adverse life events from
defaults that are strategic. In the first step, the authors estimate a logit model
in which default depends on changes in the mortgage interest rate (including two
lags), four-quarter change in county unemployment rates (including a quadratic
term), four-quarter change in the 60+ day credit card delinquencies for a county
(including a quadratic term), along with loan-age and time dummies. The logit
model also includes dummies for various levels of book equity; excluding book
equity dummies would overestimate the role of liquidity shocks. Book equity is
measured using zipcode level repeat sales house price indexes by First American
CoreLogic. Once the logit model is estimated the authors use the fitted values of
the regression to construct the probability of a household defaulting due to a liq-
uidity shock, based on observable characteristics. This probability is incorporated
into the maximum likelihood estimation in the second step. The authors assume
that the absolute value of normalized book equity follows a Gamma distribution.
The second step involves the maximum likelihood estimation of the shape and
scale parameters of the Gamma distribution.
The estimates of the shape and scale parameters are 1.68 and 45. The estimates
imply that the median borrower walks away when normalized book equity falls
to -62%. The standard deviation of the distribution is 58%. The authors also
find that the median borrower in recourse states (Florida and Nevada) defaults
when normalized book equity is 20-30% lower (more negative) than the median
borrower in non-recourse states. Borrowers with higher FICO scores default at
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lower levels of normalized book equity. The median default threshold for borrowers
with FICO scores between 620-680 is -51%, as compared to -68% for borrowers
with FICO scores greater than 720. Normalized book equity also differs across
mortgage types. The median borrower with a short-term hybrid mortgage defaults
when normalized book equity is -50%, which is 30% higher than normalized book
equity for the median borrower with a fixed rate mortgage.
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Figure 1.2: The probability density function of the distribution of borrower de-
fault costs implied by a model of strategic default with zero lender default costs
for default thresholds estimated by Bhutta, Dokko, and Shan (2010). Borrower
default costs are expressed as a percentage of the purchase price.
The findings of Bhutta, Dokko, and Shan (2010) can be used to inform the
choice of borrower default costs in the model presented in Section 1.2. Figure 1.1
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shows that a borrower with 100% initial LTV ratio who defaults when normalized
book equity equals -62% faces default costs equity to 30% of the purchase price
of the property; the point (100, -62) is marked with a solid black dot. Figure 1.2
shows the entire distribution of borrower default costs kb implied by the work of
Bhutta, Dokko, and Shan (2010); recall that kb is measured as a percentage of the
purchase price. The standard deviation of kb is 15.58%.
1.5 Payment Size
The size of mortgage payments is an important determinant of default ac-
cording to theories of both strategic and non-strategic default. Evaluating the
importance of payment size empirically, however, has been difficult because bor-
rowers usually refinance their mortgage when payments increase. This behavior
confounds estimates of payment increases because it leads to borrower selection.
Fuster and Willen (2012) overcome the selection problem by studying the effect of
payment size in a group of borrowers who experienced a drop in payment, making
refinancing unattractive. They find that reducing a borrower’s payment in half
reduces the probability of becoming delinquent by 55%.
The study exploits resets on Alt-A hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs)
with a 10-year interest-only period. Hybrid ARMs feature a fixed coupon payment
for an initial period of 3, 5, 7, or 10 years. The mortgage coupon rate adjusts
semi annually or annually after the initial period. The new rate depends on the
level of market interest rates, as measured by LIBOR or one year Treasury Bill
rates. The 10-year interest-only feature implies that the size of the payment for
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mortgages with an initial period of 3, 5, or 7 years increases (decreases) at the
first reset date with an increase (decrease) in the market interest rate. In contrast
payment size for a mortgage with an initial period of 10 years usually increases
at the first reset date, even if the market rate decreases, because the mortgage
starts amortizing at this date. The authors focus on first liens of Alt-A hybrid
ARMs originated between January 1, 2005 and June 30, 2006; the data are from
LoanPerformance. The focus is on 10-year interest-only hybrid ARMs originated
during this time period because, in this sample, hybrid ARMs with 3- and 5-year
initial periods experienced a large drop in payments when they first reset; the
mean reduction in the interest rate for mortgages with a 5-year initial period was
about 3%.
The empirical specification uses a Cox proportional hazard framework; this
specification is standard in the mortgage default literature, see Section 1.3. Since
the study focuses on changes in mortgage interest rates, the effect of initial and
current mortgage interest rates is captured flexibly using indicator variables for
bins of various interest rate values. The estimates indicate that a 2% (3%) drop in
the payment at the first reset date lowers the baseline default probability by 40%
(55%). The reduction in default probability from the 2% (3%) drop in payments
corresponds to a reduction in baseline CLTV from 135 to 105 (145 to 95), holding
payment fixed. The coefficients on other control variables are consistent with prior
studies.
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1.6 Mortgage Yields
Many analysts purport that mortgage default risk was systematically under-
priced prior to the financial crisis of 2008. Krainer, LeRoy, and O (2009) ask
whether the data support this view. They calibrate the model of strategic default
presented in Section 1.2 and compare the model implied mortgage yield spreads to
those in the data. Contrary to the claim of systematic underpricing, the authors
find that the model generates mortgage yield spreads that are consistent with the
data for empirically realistic parameter values.
The study uses data from LPS Applied Analytics. It focuses on purchase
FRMs and ARMs originated between 2000 and 2007 on California properties. The
authors note that default in the model depends only on initial LTV and house
price changes. In practice, however, other risk characteristics that are correlated
with initial LTV also matter for default; examples include location of property,
borrower credit score, mortgage type, subprime status etc. The authors separate
the contribution of initial LTV to the initial yield spread from that of other risk
factors by running an OLS regression of the yield spread on all risk characteristics.
Following standard practice in the mortgage default literature the authors model
initial LTV as a linear spline. The adopted specification uses 5% buckets with
45-50% being the first and 95-100% being the last. They find that the coefficient
on the 95-100% LTV bucket corresponds to a spread of 40 basis points for FRMs,
and 90 basis points for ARMs. The interpretation being that, conditional on
other risk characteristics, raising the initial LTV on a FRM (ARM) from 45-50%
to 95-100% raises initial yield spreads by 40 (90) basis points.
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Focusing on FRMs, the authors calibrate the model to see if empirically real-
istic parameter values generate an initial yield spread of approximately 40 basis
points. The discount rate is ρ = 7% and the expected proportional gain in housing
services is α = 3%. These parameters generate a reasonable price to rent ratio,
once maintainence and utilities expenses incurred in practice are taken into ac-
count; see footnote 2 earlier. Two sets of parameter values generate yield spreads
close to 40 basis points for mortgages with an initial LTV around 95%. The first
has the volatility parameter at σ = 15%, borrower default costs equal to 16%
of the purchase price, and lender default costs equal to zero. These parameter
values along with c = 1.75 generate a mortgage with an initial LTV of 92% and an
initial yield spread of 60 basis points. The second set of parameters has σ = 10%,
and borrower and lender default costs equal to 16% of the purchase price. In this
case, c = 1.75 generates a mortgage with an initial LTV of 95% and an initial
yield spread of 36 basis points. The authors note that the lender default costs are
unrealistically zero in the first parametrization, and that the volatility parameter
might be unrealistically low in the second; see footnote 3 earlier.
1.7 Moral and Social Attitudes
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) complement existing work on strategic
default by using survey data to study the willingness of American households to
default strategically. Motivated by discussions in the popular press regarding the
morality of strategic default, the authors try to determine the moral and social
attitudes of homeowners towards strategic default. The study uses data from
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the December 2008 and March 2009 waves of the Chicago Booth Kellogg School
Financial Trust Index Survey, in which a representative sample of 1000 households
were surveyed. The authors only include the respondents who reported being in
charge of the household financials, possibly along with their spouse. Only the
responses of homeowners are reported.
The survey elicited the willingness to strategically default by asking the fol-
lowing question: “If the value of your mortgage exceeded the value of your house
by 50K would you walk away from your house (that is, default on your mortgage)
even if you could afford to pay your monthly mortgage?” Homeowners could an-
swer “yes”, “no”, or “I don’t know”. Those who answered no were asked if they
would default when the mortgage value exceeded the value of the house by 100K.
Homeowners who responded negatively to the previous question were asked the
same question with the 100K replaced by 300K (December wave) or 200K (March
wave). The responses are qualitatively consistent with theory: 9% of homeowners
are willing to walk away at 50K, 26% at 100K, 41% at 200K, and 45% at 300K.
These numbers correspond to total defaults of 9% at 50K, 32% at 100K, 61% at
200K (March wave), and 63% at 300K (December wave).
Homeowners’ views regarding the morality of strategic default were obtained
by asking: “Do you think that it is morally wrong to walk away from a house
when one can afford to pay the mortgage?” 81% responded yes. People who
consider strategic default immoral are less likely to indicate their willingness to
strategically default, conditional on their mortgage value exceeding the value of
their house by a specific amount. For example, only 7% of yes-respondents are
willing to strategically default when the difference between the two values is 50K,
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as compared to 20% of no-respondents. In order to determine social attitudes
towards strategic default, the survey asked the participants if they knew a strategic
defaulter. Nine percent of homeowners knew one, and 26% of these homeowners
perceived that default as strategic. Conditional on morality, homeowners who
know a defaulter, and perceived that default as strategic, are 82% more likely to
declare their intention to default strategically.
1.8 Second Liens
For institutional reasons home purchases with initial LTV ratios greater than
80% are usually financed using two separate mortgage liens. The first lien has an
80% LTV ratio, and the rest of the loan is financed by the second lien. For example,
the first and second liens on a home purchase with a 5% downpayment will have
LTV ratios of 80% and 15%. Second lien mortgages allow borrowers to have lower
equity in their homes. New borrowers can use second liens to buy a house with
little or no downpayment. Existing borrowers can take out second liens after
the origination date and use them to finance consumption by borrowing against
built up equity in the house. Second mortgages fall into one of two categories:
closed end home equity loans (HELOANs) or revolving home equity lines of credit
(HELOCs). Lee, Mayer, and Tracy (2012) provide an overview of the market
for second lien mortgages. These authors note that understanding the default
behavior of borrowers with multiple liens is important because second liens grew
in importance rapidly prior to the crisis: the total balances outstanding on second
lien mortgages was $1.1 trillion in 2006. They also point out that most second liens
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are not securitized; they are held on lenders’ balance sheets instead. Therefore
default in this sector of the mortgage market directly affects the financial health
of banks.
Lee, Mayer, and Tracy (2012) find that 21% of HELOANs (31% of HELOCs)
remain current four quarters after the first mortgage becomes 90 days delinquent.
Their findings are similar to Jagtiani and Lang (2010) who find that 31% of
borrowers in their sample are 90+ days delinquent on their first lien while staying
current on the second (24% for HELOANs and 34% for HELOCs). The second
study also finds that, surprisingly, 20% of borrowers stay current on their second
mortgage even after the first lender forecloses on the property. Qualitatively, it
is not clear that defaulting on a particular lien dominates. On the one hand,
if borrowers with HELOCs default on their first lien and stay current on their
second, they maintain access to a line of credit until the first lender forecloses.
Access to such credit maybe very valuable during times of financial distress. On
the other hand, borrowers might want to default on their second lien and stay
current on their first lien because the second lender maybe less inclined to initiate
foreclosure proceedings. The reluctance of the second lender to foreclose stems
from the fact that he must acquire the first lien before he initiates foreclosure
proceedings, thereby exposing himself to additional default risk.
Jagtiani and Lang (2010) merge credit data from the Federal Reserve Board
Consumer Credit Panel (Equifax database) with mortgage data from LPS Applied
Analytics; Elul, Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon, and Hunt (2010) describe
how the two datasets are merged. In addition, they use state-level home price
indexes from the FHFA. The focus is on homeowners who have a first mortgage
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and at least one second mortgage between 2004:Q4 and 2010:Q2. The authors
run a logistic regression in which the probability of default (90+ days delinquent)
depends on explanatory variables that include log monthly payment on the first
mortgage; monthly payment on the second mortgage relative to the first; log of
unused home equity credit; dummy for mortgage type (prime, Alt-A, subprime);
credit card utilization rate; credit score; along with dummies for current LTV
greater than 90, current CLTV greater than 90, loan modification, jumbo, op-
tion ARM, HELOC, and time. Consistent with prior studies, the most important
determinants of the probability of default are the monthly payment on the first
mortgage (positive coefficient), credit score (negative coefficient), negative book
equity (positive coefficient on LTV dummy), and loan modification (positive co-
efficient). Borrower credit score and negative book equity are the most important
determinants of the probability of default on second mortgages. Loan modifica-
tions increase HELOAN default probability, but not HELOC default probability.
Borrowers who default on their first mortgage while keeping their second lien
current tend to have larger first lien payments, smaller ratio of second-to-first lien
payments, negative book equity, lower credit scores, and subprime classification.
Borrowers with HELOCs are more likely to default this way. On further investiga-
tion, the authors find that second lenders do not reduce the line of credit for 90%
of the borrowers who default on their first mortgage. The average borrower in this
position continues to maintain his pre-default utilization rate of around 90% on
his HELOC, even three quarters after defaulting on the first mortgage. Borrow-
ers who increase their HELOC utilization rates do so in small amounts, 2.6% on
average. The average borrower who decreases his utilization rate does so by 4.2%.
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The fact that borrowers do not change their HELOC utilization rates much after
defaulting on their first mortgage suggests that maintainence of a credit line may
not be the primary reason why distressed borrowers keep their second mortgages
current.
1.9 Lender Recourse
Mortgages in the United States are perceived to be non-recourse loans. This
is inspite of the fact that mortgage lenders in many states have legal recourse in
the form of deficiency judgements against defaulting borrowers. Analysts point
out that mortgage recourse laws are ineffective because deficiency judgements
have little value: they are costly, defaulting borrowers have little non-housing
wealth, and there are many ways to defeat the judgement. The perception is
corroborated by the observation that deficiency judgements are rarely observed
in practice. Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) find that conventional wisdom regarding
recourse is incorrect. Recourse deters borrowers from defaulting: the probability
of default in non-recourse states is 32% higher, at the average value of negative
book equity for defaulted loans.
These authors use data on mortgages originated between August 1997 and
December 2008, provided by LPS Applied Analytics. They note that the effect
of recourse on default is not evident in unconditional default rates across states;
unconditional default rates across states are statistically indistinguishable. It is
not evident in the conditional default rates from a probit model either. The au-
thors regress the probability of default on the value of the default option (linear
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and squared), controls for loan and borrower characteristics across states, and a
dummy variable for recourse.8 The controls include divorce and unemployment
rate for the state (not seasonally adjusted), a categorical variable for the value
of the prepayment option, age of the loan in months, LTV at origination, the
borrower’s FICO score at origination, dummies for mortgage type (interest-only,
adjustable-rate, jumbo, or non-purchase), and a dummy for LTV ratio being ex-
actly 80% (also interacted with the default option value and the value squared).
The estimates show that conditional default rates across states are statistically in-
distinguishable; the coefficient on the recourse dummy is statistically insignificant
at the 10% level.
Even though the unconditional and conditional default rates are statistically
indistinguishable across recourse and non-recourse states, the presence of recourse
does affect default behavior. The effect is captured by the coefficient on the in-
teraction between recourse and the value of the default option, which is negative
and significant at the 5% level — borrowers in non-recourse states are more sensi-
tive to negative book equity than borrowers in recourse states. Ceteris paribus, a
1% drop in book equity increases the probability of default more in non-recourse
states, as compared to recourse states. The effect is nonlinear: the coefficient on
the interaction between recourse and the quadratic default option term is posi-
tive and significant at the 5% level. The effect is stronger for houses with higher
8The authors measure the value of the default option as the probability that the book value
of equity, divided by the imputed value of the house, is less than zero. They calculate the
book value of equity as the imputed value of the house minus the principal outstanding on the
mortgage. The imputed value of the house at a particular date is the purchase price of the house
multiplied by the gross return on the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)
house price index for the state at that date, calculated from the date of mortgage origination.
The house price index is assumed to follow a log-normal distribution.
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appraised values at the mortgage origination date. The authors note that these
findings are consistent with borrower default thresholds in non-recourse states
being higher than default thresholds in recourse states.
Even though deficiency judgements are infrequent in the data, they do influ-
ence default behavior. The threat of a deficiency judgement induces defaulting
borrowers to cooperate with the lender. Borrowers in recourse states are 10%
less likely to default using a foreclosure, as opposed to a short sale or a deed in
lieu.9 Borrowers prefer cooperative methods of default because they affect access
to future credit less severely than a forcible eviction. These findings show that the
conventional wisdom that deficiency judgements are rarely observed because they
are not valuable is incorrect. In fact, deficiency judgements are rarely observed
because they pose a credible threat to borrowers, who respond by cooperating
with the lender when they default.
9A short sale occurs when the borrower sells the house for less than the debt outstanding
and turns over the proceeds to the lender, who waives his right to deficiency. A deed in lieu
occus when the borrower turns over the house keys to the lender, who forgives the outstanding
debt. The transfer of the deed is risky. It maybe deemed improper by a bankruptcy court if the
borrower files for bankruptcy within a year of the transfer. Moreover, unlike a foreclosure, the
transfer does not eliminate any subordinate liens on the property.
Borrowers in recourse states may also default using a friendly foreclosure, in which the bor-
rower waives his right to contest the foreclosure and submits to the court’s ruling. A friendly
foreclosure cuts off subordinate liens on the property and protects the lender if the borrower
files for bankruptcy. Friendly foreclosures take longer than deed transfers, but not as long as
contested foreclosures. The authors cannot observe whether a foreclosure is friendly or not, so
they cannot identify the effect of recourse on friendly foreclosures.
34
Chapter 1. A Survey of the Determinants of Mortgage Default
1.10 Insolvency, Credit Constraints, and Unem-
ployment
The model of default presented in Section 1.2 assumes that the borrower has
enough financial resources to make his mortgage payment at all times. This as-
sumption rules out default due to job loss, divorce, medical bills, and other adverse
life events that affect the borrower’s ability to meet his mortgage obligation. The
adopted model specification is, of course, unrealistic. A borrower’s ability to meet
his mortgage payment does matter for default, implying a role for adverse life
events. For example, a borrower who does not have enough cash, either because
he has no savings or because he cannot borrow from other sources, will not be
able to pay his mortgage. This section discusses papers that focus on how factors
that affect borrowers’ ability to pay impact mortgage default. Even though the
emphasis is on life events and credit constraints, negative book equity continues to
play an important role in mortgage default. Borrowers with positive book equity
would prefer to sell the house and prepay the mortgage loan instead. Since bor-
rower’s who default because of adverse life events also have negative book equity,
studies often refer to these defaults as being induced by two “triggers” or “double
trigger” default.
A major difficulty faced by analysts who study the relationship between ad-
verse life events or credit constraints and mortgage default is that existing mort-
gage datasets do not usually provide detailed information on the financial position
of borrowers. The empirical studies discussed here overcome this difficulty by com-
bining two separate data sources. Elul, Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon, and
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Hunt (2010) take this approach and ask whether negative book equity or credit
constraints faced by borrowers are relatively more important for mortgage de-
fault. These authors combine mortgage data from LPS Applied Analytics and
credit data from Equifax.10 They focus on FRMs originated in 2005-2006 for
purchase of single-family owner occupied properties, with maturities of 15, 30, or
40 years. The credit data allows them to observe key characteristics of different
types of debts held by individuals. In addition, the authors employ MSA-level
house price indexes from the FHFA and county level unemployment rates from
the BLS.
Elul, Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon, and Hunt (2010) estimate a dynamic
logit model with a dummy for default (60+ day delinquency) as the dependent
variable. The independent variables control for various borrower and mortgage
characteristics including initial LTV, FICO score, current CLTV, bank card uti-
lization rate, total second mortgage balance, change in county unemployment rate
over the previous twelve months, and interactions of current CLTV with bank card
utilization rate and with change in unemployment. Current CLTV, card utiliza-
tion rate, and twelve-month change in unemployment are all modeled as linear
splines in order to allow for flexibile estimation.
Consistent with other studies, the authors find that current CLTV is an impor-
tant determinant of mortgage default. The default probability is monotonically
increasing in current CLTV. For example, increasing current CLTV from 50 to
above 120 increases the probability of default 1.3 percentage points per quarter
(pp/q). Default probabilities also increase with bank card utilization rates, even
10Borrowers in the two datasets were linked based on uniquely matched open date, initial
balance, and zip code of the first mortgage.
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after controlling for CLTV and other risk factors. For example, increasing the
utilization rate from below 70% to above 80% raises the default probability by 0.9
pp/q. Both the interaction terms are statistically significant and quantitatively
important. The default probability of borrowers with current CLTV between 90-
100% and high card utilization rates (greater than 80%) is 1.5 pp/q larger than
that of borrowers with low utilization rates. Similarly, the default probability of
borrowers with current CLTV above 120 who live in counties that experienced
large increases (greater than 1.25 pp) in the twelve-month unemployment rate is
1.1 pp/q larger than that of borrowers in counties that experienced small increases
in the twelve-month unemployment rate.
Gerardi, Herkenhoff, Ohanian, and Willen (2013) note that most studies that
focus on the “double trigger” hypothesis of mortgage default do not have data on
the employment status of borrowers. These studies use regional unemployment
rates as a proxy instead. The studies usually find that regional unemployment, by
itself, is not a quantitatively important determinant of default. Gerardi, Herken-
hoff, Ohanian, and Willen (2013) show that regional unemployment rates do not
proxy well for individual employment status. The authors use data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which contains information on mortgage char-
acteristics, employment status of borrowers, and borrowers’ balance sheets. Con-
trary to many other studies, these authors find that individual employment status
is the strongest predictor of default; Gyourko and Tracy (2013) arrive at a similar
conclusion using simulated data. The default probability of an individual who
loses his job increases by 5-13 pp; for comparison the average default rate in the
sample is 3.9%.
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The authors estimate a logit model. They regress a dummy for default (60+
day delinquency) on mortgage characteristics, borrower characteristics, and vari-
ables that proxy for local economic conditions and economic environment. Mort-
gage characteristics include CLTV (linear spline), mortgage type, mortgage inter-
est rate, and dummies for maturity greater than 15 years, presence of second lien,
and refinance. Borrower characteristics include total household income, liquid and
illiquid assets owned, unsecured debt outstanding, hospital bills outstanding, and
employment status of the head of the household. Variables for local economic
conditions include recent house price appreciation as measured by FHFA state-
level indices, state-level unemployment rates, and dummies for recourse, judicial
foreclosure, and properties located in Arizona, California, Florida, or Nevada.
The results show that CLTV is an important determinant of default. The default
probability for households with CLTV ≥ 120 is 6 pp larger than that for house-
holds with positive book equity. The default probability for households who have
been unemployed 6+ months is 9 to 10 pp larger than that for employed house-
holds. On interacting the dummy for employment status with CLTV dummies,
the authors find that near-negative book equity combined with job loss increases
the default probability by 8 pp.
Most papers discussed in this section so far have been empirical. The theoret-
ical model presented in Section 1.2 abstracts from the role played by adverse life
events in mortgage default. Campbell and Cocco (2011) address this gap in the
literature by studying the mortgage default decision of a household in an economic
environment that features four different sources of risk: labor income, inflation,
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interest rates, and house prices. The authors consider default in FRMs, ARMs,
and interest-only balloon payment mortgages.
Households in the model are active for a finite number of periods. Household
preferences are separable over housing, non-durable consumption, and terminal
wealth; house size is fixed for simplicity. In each period households choose non-
durable consumption and savings. Households save in one-period bonds and hous-
ing. The housing decision requires them to choose between making their mortgage
payment, defaulting, or selling the house and prepaying the mortgage. Households
that default or sell must rent thereafter. Rent equals the user cost of housing mul-
tiplied by the value of the house. Home sales are subject to realtor fees. Motivated
by the existence of social welfare programs in practice, households are assumed
to always have access to a subsistence level of cash. This assumption rules out
defaults caused by high marginal utilities of the non-durable consumption good.
Nominal interest rates in the model are stochastic because both the expected
inflation rate and the ex ante real interest rate are stochastic. Expected inflation
follows an AR(1) process. Log real returns follow a random walk. These processes
are calibrated using data from the Federal Reserve. Labor income cannot be
traded or collateralized. It depends on age, individual characteristics, a permanent
shock, and a transitory shock. Income is taxed at a constant rate. Real house
prices follow a random walk with positive drift. Homeownership serves as a hedge
against inflation. Homeowners pay property taxes and maintainence fees that
are proportional to house prices each period; the tax rate and the fee rate differ
from each other and do not change over time. House prices and the permanent
component of labor income are correlated. The processes for labor income and
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house prices are calibrated using PSID data from 1970-2005; the two processes
turn out to be positively correlated.
The analysis considers three different types of mortgages: FRMs, ARMs, and
interest-only (I/O) balloon payment mortgages. Nominal mortgage interest pay-
ments are income tax deductible. The credit risk premium on mortgages is ex-
ogenously specified.
The authors find that most defaults occur between between two and eight
years after the origination date. As in other studies on mortgage default, the
analysis shows that negative book equity is a necessary but not a sufficient con-
dition for default. Households with negative book equity between 0 and -20% of
the outstanding mortgage balance tend to default when their current mortgage
payment-to-income ratio (MTI) is large. The authors compare default behavior
across mortgage types and find that cash flow considerations are relatively more
important for ARMs, whereas wealth reasons are relatively more important for
FRMs and I/O balloon payment mortgages. The analysis shows that borrowers
with ARMs tend to default when inflation and nominal interest rates are high, re-
sulting in higher current mortgage payments. In contrast, borrowers with FRMs
tend to default when inflation and nominal interest rates are low, implying a
higher debt burden in real terms. Interest rates are not a major determinant of
default in aggregate states with large house price declines; negative book equity
is the primary determinant of default instead.
The analysis also shows how initial LTV and initial loan-to-income (LTI) ratios
affect mortgage default. Campbell and Cocco (2011) decompose the probability
of default into the product of the probability of negative book equity and the
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probability of default conditional of negative book equity. Conditional on initial
LTI, higher initial LTV ratios increase the probability of negative book equity
unambiguously. The effect on the probability of default conditional on negative
book equity, however, is ambiguous: higher initial LTV implies that the borrower
will face negative book equity earlier in the life of the mortgage, when the value
of the option to wait is the highest. Conditional on initial LTV, higher initial LTI
ratios increase the probability of default unambiguously; the effect is nonlinear.
Schelkle (2012) complements the work of Campbell and Cocco (2011) by com-
paring default rates generated by a similar model of mortgage default to the data.
He finds that predictions of a calibrated version of the model are broadly consis-
tent with default rates in the data. The study also compares aggregate default
rates in the data to default rates implied by reduced form versions of the friction-
less model of strategic default and of the double trigger theory of default. The
analysis uses data provided by LPS Applied Analytics on prime 30-year fixed-rate
first mortgages originated between 2002 and 2008. The two models are compared
based on out of sample predictions of default rates, after estimating the parame-
ters for each model using default rates from the 2002 cohort. The findings indicate
that the default rates implied by the double trigger theory are closer to the data.
1.11 Conclusion
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 has raised a lot of questions about mortgage
default and the interactions of the mortgage market with the broader economy.
This paper surveys recent research on what determines mortgage default. The
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focus on the determinants of mortgage default necessitated the omission of many
interesting papers that are related to the housing and mortgage market, but do
not address the question at hand directly. For example, Haughwout, Okah, and
Tracy (2009) study the effectiveness of mortgage modification programs; Camp-
bell, Giglio, and Pathak (2011) study negative externalities from foreclosures;
Krainer and Laderman (2009), and Elul (2011) study whether mortgages that are
securitized are different, in initial characteristics and default performance, from
those that are held on bank balance sheets; Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011),
and Corbae and Quintin (2013) develop quantitative equilibrium models of the
housing market that focus on aggregate homeownership rates or foreclosure rates.
Even though significant progress has been made in understanding the determi-
nants of mortgage default, there are still many challenges and open questions. In
particular, the debate on the relative contribution of negative book equity and ad-
verse life events to mortgage default is still unsettled. Many studies on mortgage
default try to inform the debate by distinguishing between defaults that are pri-
marily a result of negative book equity — strategic default — and defaults due to
adverse life events — non-strategic default. In practice, however, the distinction
between strategic and non-strategic default is not clear. For example, a borrower
who loses his job will not default on his mortgage unless he also has negative
book equity. Is default by this borrower strategic because negative book equity is
necessary for default? Is it non-strategic because he experienced an adverse life
event before default? Would the borrower have defaulted on his mortgage even
if he had not lost his job? These are some of the questions that arise when one
attempts to classify default as strategic or non-strategic.
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An alternative approach is to avoid the distinction between strategic and non-
strategic default altogether and focus on how borrowers’ home equity affects mort-
gage default decisions. Krainer, LeRoy, and O (2009) take this approach; the
model developed by these authors was discussed in Section 1.2.11 The advantage
of the alternative approach is that it results in a clear analysis of mortgage default:
Borrowers default when the economic value of equity is zero.
This dissertation builds on the analysis in Krainer, LeRoy, and O (2009) in
order to address two important questions on mortgage default. Chapter 2 studies
how optimal mortgage default by homeowners affects the valuation of mortgage
backed securities. The importance of the connection between mortgage default
and valuation of mortgage backed securities is highlighted by the global financial
crisis of 2007-2008. The crisis was precipitated by a rise in mortage defaults that
led to financial institutions facing the prospect of large losses on mortgage backed
securities.
Chapter 3 studies the optimal default decision of borrowers with mortgages
that feature payment resets. These mortgages grew in popularity in the buildup
to the financial crisis. Some analysts of mortgage default attribute the rise in
mortgage defaults to unanticipated payment increases at the reset date. Other
analysts, however, point out that default rates in the data did not spike at the
reset date. The analysis in Chapter 3 informs this debate by providing conditions
under which optimal default boundaries in these mortgages feature a jump at
the reset date. The analysis shows that, under certain conditions, the default
11In the alternative approach, adverse life events would affect default through the economic
value of home equity. Krainer, LeRoy, and O (2009) abstract from the role of adverse life events
in order to maintain tractability.
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boundary is discontinuous at the reset date even if the size of the payment reset
is known at the mortgage origination date.
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Chapter 2
Pricing Default Risk in Mortgage
Backed Securities
2.1 Introduction
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) were at the center of the financial crisis of
2007-2008. Large unexpected drops in house prices resulted in mortgage defaults,
which in turn impaired associated MBS. Large unprecedented losses on MBS,
which were thought to be virtually immune to default risk and rated so, led
analysts to conclude that these securities were “toxic” and difficult to value. Banks
and other financial institutions that held large quantities of these assets were
adversely affected. The crisis began.
The events leading up to the financial crisis highlight the need for a framework
for MBS valuation that explicitly incorporates mortgage default. The goal of this
paper is to provide such a framework. The analysis is conducted in two stages.
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First, I model the mortgage lending market as in Krainer, LeRoy, and O (2009).1
Housing services follow a geometric Brownian motion, implying that changes in
housing services are exogenous and unforecastable. House prices equal the ex-
pected discounted value of services so they are also unforecastable. Borrowers
buy houses using mortgages. They have the option to default on their mortgages,
subject to a cost. They exercise this option so as to maximize equity. Mortgage
lenders make zero expected profits. I solve for equilibrium yield spreads in this
setting. The equilibrium is characterized using boundary crossing properties of
geometric Brownian motion. To the best of my knowledge, this solution method
is new to the mortgage valuation literature. The key advantage of this method is
that it reduces the valuation of mortgages to a simple present value calculation.
Second, I model the MBS market. In practice, the term mortgage backed
security is applied to a large class of mortgage bonds and their derivatives. To
begin with, the analysis focuses on Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs).2
These securities are created by combining mortgages into a pool, dividing the pool
into senior and subordinate tranches, structuring the pool’s cash flows so as to
protect the senior tranche from default risk, and selling claims to cash flows on
each tranche as bonds. I assume that CMOs are created either from pools that
contain one type of mortgage only — homogeneous pools — or pools that contain
two types of mortgages — heterogeneous pools.
1Krainer, LeRoy, and O (2009) were the first to connect optimal mortgage default to equi-
librium yield spreads. They did so by adapting Merton (1974) to the housing market and using
the zero expected profit condition to close Merton’s model.
2In practice, CMOs can be broadly divided into “agency” CMOs, which are insured against
default risk by Government Sponsored Enterprises, and “non-agency” CMOs, which are not
insured by them. The analysis here focuses on default risk so it applies primarily to non-agency
CMOs.
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For homogeneous pools, I find that senior bonds are risk-free or risky in equilib-
rium, depending on the relative size of the senior tranche. Risk-free senior bonds
do not experience principal or coupon shortfalls, whereas risky senior bonds may
experience principal shortfalls. The equilibrium initial yield on risky senior bonds
is a linearly decreasing function of the recovery rate of the tranche. As an appli-
cation, I consider the valuation of mortgages with two liens. In practice, these
mortgages usually consist of a first lien with an 80% loan-to-value ratio and a
smaller second lien with a 10-15% loan-to-value ratio. I provide conditions under
which the first lien is risk-free in the presence of the second lien, but not otherwise.
The heterogeneous pool contains two mortgages that differ in terms of borrower
default costs only; these are referred to as low default cost and high default cost
mortgages. This pool experiences up to two default events. I find that, depending
on the relative size of the senior tranche, senior bonds can be risk-free, low-risk, or
high-risk in equilibrium. Risk-free senior bonds receive both principal and coupon
payments even if both the underlying mortgages default. Low-risk senior bonds
receive all coupon payments until both mortgages default, but do not recover their
entire principal. High-risk senior bonds experience both principal and coupon
shortfalls if the underlying mortgages default. The equilibrium initial yield on
senior bonds increases as the relative size of the senior tranche increases. I also find
that an increase in the fraction of high default cost mortgages has two opposing
effects on equilibrium initial yields of senior bonds: it decreases the initial yield
by reducing the likelihood of default and it increases the initial yield by reducing
the net recovery on default.
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As a quantitative exercise, I calculate model implied bond prices when data
from the Case-Shiller composite-20 index is fed through the model; the data is
from July 2006 to July 2011. I find that senior bonds lose about 10% of their
value and residual bonds lose about 60% of their value during this time period.
Next I turn to valuation of CMO-squared and other higher order CMOs.3 The
standard models used by practitioners to value CMO-squared have been widely
criticized because they do not connect valuation to mortgage default explicitly.4
A contribution of my paper is to make this connection and provide an alternative
to these models. A CMO-squared is created using a pool made from the residual
tranche of the CMO, dividing this pool again into senior and residual tranches,
and restructuring the pool’s cash flows so as to protect the senior CMO-squared
tranche from default risk. I find that the default risk of senior CMO-squared
bonds is higher than that of senior CMO bonds, when the relative sizes of senior
CMO and senior CMO-squared tranches are identical. The analysis in this section
extends to higher order CMOs. I present an example in which the senior tranche
of a CMO-cubed suffers a hundred percent principal write down when low default
cost mortgages are terminated. When the Case-Shiller house price index is fed
through the model, prices of senior CMO-squared bonds drop to 50% of their par
values. Prices of residual CMO-squared bonds drop 100%, rendering these bonds
worthless. The quantitative findings are roughly consistent with the empirical
work of Cordell, Huang, and Williams (2012). These authors report that, in
the data, the average principal write down on senior AAA-rated CMO-squared
3CMO-squared are often called Collateralized Debt Obligations in practice.
4Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008b) discuss how analysts of CMO-squared modeled correla-
tion between mortgage defaults directly and estimated this correlation using historical data.
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tranches was 67% in 2006 and 76% in 2007; the average write-down for other
tranches was 93%.
Finally, I consider the valuation of Credit Default Swaps (CDSs). A CDS is
insurance against default. The quantitative exercise in this section suggests that
default risk is a major factor in the pricing of CDS written on the residual CMO
tranche, but not for CDS on the senior CMO tranche. Comparing these findings
to the price declines observed in the ABX.HE CDS index, the model suggests that
default risk by itself cannot account for the large price declines observed in the
senior AAA-rated index.5 It may, however, account for a large fraction of the price
declines observed in the lower-rated indexes. These findings are consistent with
recent research on the ABX.HE index: Stanton and Wallace (2011) show that the
observed price declines in the ABX.AAA-HE index cannot be accounted for, by
any reasonable expectation regarding defaults and recovery rates on the underlying
mortgages. In contrast, Fender and Scheicher (2009) conclude that default risk
was an important factor in the pricing of lower-rated ABX.HE indexes.
5The ABX.HE index was launched in January 2006 by Markit Group Ltd. in consortium
with fifteen investment banks (these banks are usually CDS sellers). The ABX.HE index tracks
the price of a single CDS written on a fixed basket of 20 equally weighted CMO pools. Every
CMO comprising the index must meet certain criteria; see Markit (2008) for details. The CMOs
are classified based on their ratings at the origination date of the index. For example, AAA
rated bonds from all the 20 pools comprise the AAA ABX.HE index. These credit ratings are
the ratings agencies’ assessment of the CMOs at the date of index origination. A new series
of the index was scheduled for release every six months. However, the decline in house prices
significantly reduced the availability of subprime CMOs, so no new series were released for
vintages after 2007. The four vintages that were released according to the six month schedule
are 2006-1, 2006-2, 2007-1, and 2007-2.
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2.2 Mortgage Market
Setup.– The setup of the mortgage market is as in Krainer, LeRoy, and O
(2009, KLO from here on). A house provides a stochastic flow of services. Housing
services x(t) are exogenous and follow a geometric Brownian motion:
dx(t) = αx(t)dt+ σx(t)dw(t), (2.1)
where α is the expected proportional growth rate, σ is the volatility parameter,
and w(t) is standard Brownian motion. I normalize initial housing services to one,
x(0) = 1.
House prices are the expected discounted value of future services:
P (x(t)) ≡
∫ ∞
z=t
e−r(z−t)Et
(
x(z)
)
dz =
x(t)
r − α . (2.2)
The operator Et denotes the mathematical expectation conditional on information
available at time t. The discount rate r is exogenous and constant. House prices
can be represented by (2.2) if housing services follow a geometric Brownian mo-
tion under the risk neutral probability measure or if agents are risk neutral. This
specification of house prices rules out bubbles. By (2.1) and Ito’s formula, house
prices also follow a geometric Brownian motion, with α as the expected propor-
tional growth rate and σ as the volatility parameter. Since geometric Brownian
motion is a Markov process, the current house price summarizes relevant past and
future information. The best forecast for house prices is that they grow at the
rate α.
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Under the normalization x(0) = 1, the purchase price of the house is P (1) =
1/(r − α). An infinitely lived borrower buys the house for its service flow x(t).
He does so using a mortgage. According to the mortgage contract, the lender
supplies funds that are applied towards the purchase. In return the borrower pays
the coupon c to the lender. The size of the mortgage equals the total amount
of funds supplied by the lender. It is exogenous. Any difference between the
purchase price and the size of the mortgage comes from the borrower’s personal
wealth, which I do not model. Once the mortgage size is specified the loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio follows. The borrower has the option to default on his mortgage,
subject to a cost, at any time by paying the lender the current market value of
the house. This assumption allows the market value of the house at the time of
default to be less than the mortgage size. The assumption corresponds in reality
to the ability of the borrower to turn over the keys and walk away from the house.
In practice, borrowers who choose to default have to bear relocation expenses,
loss of future credit access, and loss of tax benefits. I incorporate these costs into
the model by assuming that default is costly for the borrower. Borrower default
costs are denoted kβ. These costs are exogenous, and modeled as a one-time cost
paid at the time of default; the cost of default is the same regardless of the time
of default. Borrower default costs are proportional to the purchase price of the
house. The existence of negative equity mortgages in practice provides evidence
in favor of positive borrower default costs.6 Default costs, however, need not be
positive for all borrowers. The popular press has reported instances of borrowers
6As noted in KLO, if borrower default costs were zero and lenders were to supply negative
equity mortgages, then borrowers would default at the date of origination. Futhermore, the
default behavior observed in the data is difficult to reconcile with the behavior implied by a
model of costless default; see Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000).
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living rent free in their houses after defaulting on their mortgage. Such cases are
incorporated into the analysis by allowing borrower default costs to be negative.
In practice, default is also costly for lenders. Once borrowers default, lenders
gain possession of the property. The cost of maintaining, repairing, and reselling
the property is borne by lenders. Usually there is a lag, of a year or more, between
the default date and the date at which lenders can repossess and sell the property.
During this lag, lenders also lose income from coupon payments. I model these
costs as lender default costs, denoted kλ. These costs are exogenous and identical
across mortgages. Lender default costs are also a one-time cost that is paid at
the time of default; the cost is the same regardless of the time of default. Lender
default costs are proportional to the purchase price of the house.
Default costs paid by borrowers and lenders are modeled as deadweight losses
to the society. This modeling choice abstracts from the fact that some of the
costs paid by the lender (borrower) might benefit the other party. For example,
the lender’s loss of income from coupon payments will benefit the borrower. The
analysis can be modified to incorporate such transfers from the lender to the
borrower, or vice versa.
I assume that the borrower cannot prepay his mortgage when its fair value
exceeds its book value, even though he would like to do so. Thus credit risk is the
only relevant risk faced by lenders. The mortgage market is perfectly competitive
so lenders make zero expected profits.
Equilibrium.– The borrower chooses the threshold of housing services at
which to default so as to minimize his mortgage liability, or equivalently maximize
his equity. I solve this problem using boundary crossing properties of geometric
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Brownian motion. This method reduces the valuation of mortgages to a simple
present value calculation. Alternatively, one could use dynamic programming; see
KLO for this approach.
The mortgage liability minimization problem is
min
d
{
E0
[ ∫ w(d)
0
c e−rtdt
]
+ E0
[
e−rw(d)
(
P (d) + kβ
)]}
, (2.3)
where d denotes a generic default threshold and w(d) denotes the time at which
housing services hit the default threshold. The time of default is random because
housing services are random. All mathematical expectations in the minimization
problem above are conditional on information available at origination. The ran-
dom variable in all the expectations above is the default time w(d). The term
inside the first expectation is the discounted present value of the coupons paid
by the borrower until default. The term inside the second expectation is the dis-
counted present value of the borrower’s payments on default: the market value of
the house P (d), and default costs kβ.
The objective function in (2.3) can be simplified by noting that c, P (d), and
kβ can be moved out of the expectation. After evaluating the integral within the
first expectation, the problem in (2.3) becomes
min
d
{
c
r
(
1− E0
[
e−rw(d)
])
+
(
P (d) + kβ
)
E0
[
e−rw(d)
] }
. (2.4)
Calculating the mathematical expectation of e−rw(d) at origination is the key to
solving the minimization problem. This expectation is the moment generating
function of the random default time w(d) evaluated at −r. It equals dm, where
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m > 0 is the following constant
m =
(α− σ2/2) +
√(
α− σ2/2)2 + 2rσ2
σ2
. (2.5)
By the strong Markov property of geometric Brownian motion, the moment gener-
ating function of w(d) conditional on information available at time t is (d/x(t))m;
see Karatzas and Shreve (1991) for a discussion.
After substituting for E0[e−rw(d)], the objective function is entirely in terms
of the default threshold d. Standard optimization techniques apply. The optimal
default threshold is denoted δ. The threshold is
δ =
m(r − α)
m+ 1
(
c
r
− kβ
)
. (2.6)
It is strictly increasing in the mortgage coupon c, and strictly decreasing in bor-
rower default costs kβ. From here on I drop the word optimal and refer to δ as
the default threshold. I denote the optimal default time by τ ; the dependence of
the optimal default time on δ is supressed.
Let M(x(t)) denote the value of the mortgage to the lender when housing
services equal x(t). The value of the mortgage at origination is M(1). The lender
makes zero expected profits so M(1) equals the size of the mortgage. The zero
expected profit condition also implies that the equilibrium mortgage coupon c
satisfies,
M(1) = E0
[∫ τ
0
c e−rtdt
]
+ E0
[
e−rτ (P (δ)− kλ)
]
. (2.7)
54
Chapter 2. Pricing Default Risk in Mortgage Backed Securities
That is, c must be such that the value of the mortgage at origination M(1)
equals the total expected discounted value of mortgage coupons plus the expected
discounted value of the lender’s net recovery on default. After evaluating the
mathematical expectations, I solve (2.7) for the coupon c to obtain
c =
r [M(1)− (P (δ)− kλ)δm]
1− δm (2.8)
The equilibrium mortgage coupon c is strictly increasing in the size of the mortgage
M(1), and strictly decreasing in the lender’s net recovery on default P (δ)− kλ.
The equilibrium values of δ and c are found by jointly solving equations (2.6)
and (2.8). Once the equilibrium coupon is calculated, the initial yield on the
mortgage c/M(1) follows. The equilibrium asset value of the mortgage at any
time t > 0 can be calculated using an expression similar to (2.7),
M(x(t)) =
c
r
−
(c
r
+ kλ − P (δ)
)( δ
x(t)
)m
. (2.9)
The first term on the right hand side of (2.9) is the value of the mortgage in the
absence of default. The second term is the adjustment for default. On default, the
lender loses all future coupon payments c/r, pays the default cost kλ, and gains the
market value of the house at the time of default P (δ). The equilibrium asset value
of the mortgage is increasing in housing services x(t) because default in the near
future becomes less likely as x(t) increases. As x(t) approaches infinity, the value
of the mortgage approaches c/r, its value in the absence of default. At the default
threshold δ, the value of the mortgage equals its net recovery, M(δ) = P (δ)− kλ.
The recovery rate of the mortgage is M(δ)/M(1).
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2.3 Collateralized Mortgage Obligations
The analysis here focuses on the impact of default risk on valuation of MBS
so I consider a simple institutional structure in which the lender originates, re-
structures, and services the MBS. The adopted simplification abstracts away from
informational asymmetries between various entities involved in the mortgage se-
curitization process in practice; see Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) for a discus-
sion. Even though CMOs usually have many tranches, the analysis only considers
pools that are divided into two tranches. This simplification captures the essen-
tial feature of CMOs: the disproportionate division of default risk among senior
and subordinate tranches. None of the substantive conclusions, however, rely on
the assumption of two tranches. The analysis proceeds in two stages. First I
consider a CMO created from a pool that contains one type mortgage only — a
homogeneous pool. Then I analyze CMOs created from a pool that contains two
different types of mortgages — a heterogeneous pool. Pools with many mortgages
can be studied by modifying the two-mortgage pool analysis appropriately. Before
discussing the valuation of CMOs, I discuss how these securities are created in
practice.
The creation of MBS in practice involves many different entities. The orig-
inator of the mortgage usually sells it to a servicer, a financial institution that
is responsible for collecting coupon and recovery payments from the underlying
mortgage. The servicer buys many different mortgages, combines them into a
pool, and sells the pool to a trust.7 The trust sells mortgage backed bonds to
7A trust is a “Special Purpose Vehicle” (SPV) that is legally separate from the servicer, even
though it might be one of its subsidiaries. The legal separation ensures that the assets of the
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investors. These bonds may simply represent pro rata claims to the cash flows of
the pool; such bonds are called mortgage pass-throughs. Alternatively the pool
maybe divided into tranches and its cash flows restructured so as to divide de-
fault risk disproportionately among the tranches. The cash flows are structured
such that each tranche is protected from default by its subordinate tranches. The
resulting bonds are called Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs).
The disproportionate division of default risk is achieved by making the subor-
dinate tranches absorb all losses first. The senior-most bondholders do not lose
principal or coupon payments until the losses are so large that the all subordinate
bonds have been wiped out. If any of the underlying mortgages default, the recov-
ery from these mortgages is used to pay back the senior-most bondholders, while
the losses on these mortgages are applied to the subordinate bonds. Similarly,
any prepayments are applied to the senior-most bonds first. The bond adminis-
tration is carried out by a trustee, who oversees the entire transaction on behalf
of the investors and forwards all payments to them. The rating agencies rate the
bonds. The senior-most bonds have the highest ratings because they have the
lowest exposure to default risk; these bonds were usually rated AAA prior to the
crisis. The ratings decline as the level of subordination decreases.
2.3.1 Homogeneous Pool
A homogeneous pool contains a unit measure of one type of mortgage only.
The characteristics of the underlying mortgage and the pool are identical. For
SPV do not belong to the servicer. Therefore if the servicer declares bankruptcy, its creditors
cannot claim the assets of the SPV; see Gorton (2010) for further discussion of SPVs.
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example the origination value, coupon, and recovery on the underlying mortgage
and the pool are identical; the recovery on the pool is the payout to pool when
the underlying mortgage defaults. Denote the value of the pool by Vp(x(t)), its
coupon by cp, and its recovery on default by Rp. The pool receives its coupon cp
until default and then it recovers Rp. The initial yield on the pool is cp/Vp(1).
The recovery rate of the pool is Rp/Vp(1).
Tranches.– The lender divides the pool by value into two tranches — a senior
tranche and a residual tranche. Variables associated with the senior tranche are
indexed by s and those associated with the residual tranche are indexed by j.
The lender sells bonds that are pro rata claims to cash flows on each tranche.
The proceeds from the bond sale finance the initial loan to borrowers. The cash
flows to the pool are divided among the tranches so as to make the senior tranche
relatively safe, and the residual tranche relatively risky. The disproportionate
division of default risk is obtained by giving the senior tranche first claims to cash
flows, thereby making the residual tranche absorb all losses first.
The proportional value of the senior tranche at origination is exogenous. It
is denoted by 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Let Vs(x(t)) denote the value of the senior tranche
when housing services equal x(t). The value of the senior tranche at origination
is Vs(1) = θVp(1). The senior tranche receives its coupon cs until the mortgage
underlying the pool defaults. The recovery on the senior tranche is the payout to
the tranche when the underlying mortgage defaults. The recovery is
Rs = min {Vs(1), Rp} . (2.10)
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On default, the lender attempts to pay the senior tranche its entire principal
Vs(1). If he cannot do so, then he applies the entire recovery on the pool Rp
to the senior tranche; the senior tranche has first claims to the recovery on the
pool. If the senior tranche recovers its entire principal then the recovery on the
pool is adequate, Rs = Vs(1). Otherwise, the recovery on the pool is inadequate.
By the definition of Vs(1), the recovery is adequate when the proportional value
of the senior tranche at origination is less than the recovery rate of the pool,
θ ≤ Rp/Vp(1). Conversely, the recovery is inadequate when θ > Rp/Vp(1).
The recovery rate of the senior tranche is Rs/Vs(1). The recovery rate of the
tranche is always greater than the recovery rate of the pool. When the recovery on
the pool is adequate, the recovery rate of the tranche is one. When the recovery
on the pool is inadequate, the recovery on the tranche equals the recovery on the
pool, Rs = Rp, and the value of the tranche at origination is less than the value
of the pool, Vs(1) ≤ Vp(1). Therefore the recovery rate of the tranche is greater
than that of the pool, Rs/Vs(1) ≥ Rp/Vp(1). The recovery rate of the tranche and
the pool equal each other when θ = 1.
The value of the residual tranche is Vj(x(t)) = Vp(x(t))− Vs(x(t)). Its coupon
is cj = c−cs and its recovery is Rj = Rp−Rs. The recovery on the residual tranche
is strictly positive when the recovery on the pool is adequate, and Rp 6= Vs(1). It
is zero when either the recovery on the pool is inadequate, or Rp = Vs(1). The
recovery rate of this tranche is less than the recovery rate of the pool. It is so
because the recovery rate of the pool is the proportional weighted average of the
recovery rate of the tranches, and the recovery rate of the senior tranche is greater
than that of the pool.
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The coupons cs and cj are endogenous. They reflect the default risk of the
associated tranche. The recovery on the tranches admits the following interpre-
tation: On default the bond manager first buys back outstanding senior bonds
at their market value. Any cash left over after the senior bond buyback is used
to buy back residual bonds at their market value. This interpretation will be
important for the analysis of heterogeneous pools below.
Equilibrium.– To find a CMO market equilibrium, I need to find the coupon
at which the senior tranche is issued at par; the coupon on the residual tranche
follows. The equilibrium condition is
Vs(1) = E0
[∫ τ
0
e−rtcsdt
]
+ E0
[
e−rτRs
]
. (2.11)
The left hand side of (2.11) is the value of the senior tranche at origination and
the right hand side is the expected discounted value of the payments to this
tranche. The mathematical expectations in (2.11) are evaluated using the moment
generating function of τ ; the senior coupon cs follows. The implied initial yield
on the senior tranche is
cs
Vs(1)
=
r [1− (Rs/Vs(1))δm]
1− δm . (2.12)
The initial yield on the senior tranche is a linear function of its recovery rate,
Rs/Vs(1). When the recovery on the pool is adequate, the recovery rate of the
tranche is one and the initial yield equals r. The intuition behind this result is
the following: When the recovery is adequate, the senior tranche does not face
default risk. Therefore the tranche must earn the risk-free rate r in equilibrium.
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When the recovery on the pool is inadequate, the initial yield on the senior tranche
is greater than r. The difference between the initial yield on the tranche and r
reflects the higher default risk of the tranche; this difference is the yield spread
on senior bonds.
The equilibrium initial yields on the pool and the residual tranche are given by
expressions analogous to (2.12). The recovery rate of the senior tranche, the pool,
and the residual tranche can be ordered as Rs/Vs(1) ≥ Rp/Vp(1) ≥ Rj/Vj(1).
Thus initial yields on the tranches and the pool can be ordered as cs/Vs(1) ≤
c/Vp(1) ≤ cj/Vj(1). The ordering of the recovery rates shows how the default risk
is divided disproportionately among the tranches. The resulting ordering of the
initial yields shows how the division of risk affects equilibrium yields.
Table 2.1: Benchmark parametrization
Description Symbol Value
Expected return on mortgages r 7%
Drift α 3%
Volatility σ 15%
Borrower default costs kβ 0
Lender default costs kλ 2
Mortgage size M(1) 20
Numerical examples.– I present a numerical example of senior and residual
tranche yields implied by the model. Table 2.1 shows the benchmark parame-
terization. The choice of parameters follows KLO. These authors calibrated the
mortgage valuation model to data on California mortgages and found that model
implied yield spreads at origination were close to the spreads observed in the data,
for empirically plausible parameter values. The risk-free rate is r = 7%; this value
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generates empirically realistic average real proportional gains of 7% on mortgages
and home equity. The drift parameter is α = 3%. These values also imply that
the price-to-rent ratio in the model is 25. Price-to-rent ratios in data are closer
to 10 or 15. This discrepancy between the model and the data is appropriate be-
cause the model abstracts from operating costs such as maintenence and utilities
expenses. The chosen value of σ = 15% for the standard deviation of housing
services is consistent with estimates of individual house price volatitility in the
literature.8 The mortgage size is chosen to obtain an initial LTV ratio of 80%,
M(1) = 20. Borrower default costs are set to zero, kβ = 0. Lender default costs
are set to ten percent of the mortgage size, kλ = 2.
Under the normalization x(0) = 1, the implied purchase price of the house
is P (1) = 25. The equilibrium default threshold δ and mortgage coupon c are
obtained by numerically solving the system of nonlinear equations formed by
(2.6) and (2.8). In equilibrium, borrowers terminate their mortgage when house
prices drop to 67.57% of their original value. The equilibrium mortgage coupon
is c = 1.524. The equilibrium initial yield on the mortgage is c/M(1) = 7.62%.
At the default date, the lender’s net recovery is M(δ) = 14.89, so the recovery
rate of the mortgage is M(δ)/M(1) = 74.46%. The pool inherits all the mortgage
characteristics. The initial value of the pool is Vp(1) = 20, initial yield is c/Vp(1) =
7.62%, and the recovery rate is Rp/Vp(1) = 74.46%. The recovery on the pool is
adequate provided θ ≤ 0.7446. In this case, the initial yield on senior bonds is
r = 7%.
8For example, Flavin and Yamashita (2002) estimated the standard deviation of the real re-
turn on housing to be 14%. Similarly, Case and Shiller (1989) estimated the return on individual
houses to be around 14-15%.
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When θ = 0.80, the value of the senior tranche at origination is Vs(1) = 16.
Since the recovery on the senior tranche is Rs = Rp = 14.89 < 16, the recovery
on the pool is inadequate. The recovery rate of the senior tranche is Rs/Vs(1) =
93.07%. The equilibrium senior coupon is cs = 1.147 and the equilibrium initial
yield on senior bonds is cs/Vs(1) = 7.17%. The equilibrium characteristics of the
residual tranche follow from those of the senior tranche. The initial value of the
residual tranche is Rj(1) = 4, its coupon is cj = 0.377, and its initial yield is
cj/Rj(1) = 9.42%. The recovery on this tranche is Rj = 0.
The disproportionate division of default risk is reflected in the recovery rates.
The recovery rates of the senior tranche, the pool, and the residual tranche are
93.07%, 74.46% and 0%. The residual tranche is wiped out on default because
the entire recovery on the pool is applied to the senior tranche. The initial yield
spreads on the senior tranche, the pool, and the residual tranche are 0.17%, 0.62%,
and 2.42%. The yield spread on the residual tranche is higher, reflecting the fact
that the default risk of residual bonds is higher. The example reiterates how the
credit risk of the pool is divided disproportionately among the tranches to create
a relatively safe senior tranche and a relatively risky residual tranche.
To gain further insights into the model solution, I relax the assumption that
default is costless for the borrower. An increase in borrower default costs kβ
decreases the default threshold; see (2.6). The decrease in the default threshold
has two opposing effects: It lowers the probability of default, and it lowers the
lender’s net recovery on default. A lower default probability decreases the initial
yield on the mortgage, but a lower net recovery increases the initial yield. The
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Figure 2.1: Initial yield as a function of borrower default costs kβ
equilibrium initial yield on the pool, the senior tranche, and the residual tranche
is the net of these two effects.
Figure 2.1 shows equilibrium initial yields as a function of borrower default
costs; all other parameters equal their benchmark values. The solid curve in the
middle represents the pool, the bold solid curve represents the senior tranche,
and the dashed curve represents the residual tranche. The figure shows that the
initial yield on the senior tranche is always less than that on the pool, and the
initial yield on the residual tranche is always greater than that on the pool. The
initial yield on the pool is monotonically decreasing in kβ, indicating that the
probability effect dominates. The initial yield on the senior tranche first increases
with kβ and then starts declining, indicating that the recovery effect dominates
initially but is eventually overtaken by the probability effect. Since the recovery
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on the residual tranche is zero when kβ = 0, an increase in kβ does not lower the
net recovery; it only lowers the probability of default. Hence the initial yield on
the residual tranche is decreasing in kβ. As kβ increases unboundedly, all three
initial yields approach r. This finding is intuitive: if kβ →∞, then the exercise of
the default option becomes extremely costly. Therefore the underlying mortgage
becomes risk-free and all initial yields approach the risk-free rate.
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Figure 2.2: Initial yield as a function of lender default costs kλ
Figure 2.2 shows equilibrium initial yields as a function of lender default costs
kλ. (All other parameters are equal to their benchmark values. In particular,
kβ = 0.) Once again, the solid curve represents the pool, the bold solid curve
represents the senior tranche, and the dashed curve represents the residual tranche.
An increase in lender default costs kλ reduces the net recovery on the pool and
the tranches without changing the default probability; recall Rp = P (δ) − kλ.
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Therefore all three initial yield curves increase in kλ. The kinks on the yield curve
for the tranches indicate the value of kλ at which the recovery on the pool switches
from being adequate to inadequate. The senior tranche is risk-free to the left of
the kink and risky to the right of it. The recovery on the residual tranche is
positive to the left of the kink and zero to the right of it.
In practice, for institutional reasons, mortgages with LTV ratios greater than
80% usually consist of two different liens. For example, a 92% mortgage usually
consists of a first lien with an LTV of 80% and a second lien of 12%. If the borrower
defaults on the mortgage, then the first lien has first claims on the recovery. The
recovery on the second lien is positive only if the recovery on the underlying
mortgage is greater than 80%. The disproportionate division of recovery among
the two liens corresponds exactly to the division of recovery between the tranches
in the model. The first lien corresponds to the senior tranche and the second lien
corresponds to the residual tranche. Therefore the analysis of CMOs created from
homogeneous pools applies directly to the valuation of two-liened mortgages.
Consider the two-liened mortgage with a total LTV of 92%. (All other param-
eters equal their benchmark values.) The recovery rate of the mortgage is 87.17%.
A pool containing this mortgage inherits all the characteristics of the mortgage.
If the proportional value of the senior tranche at origination is 0.87, then the
tranche corresponds to the first lien of the mortgage. The proportional value of
the tranche is less than the recovery rate of the pool, so the recovery on the pool
is adequate and the senior tranche is risk-free. Correspondingly, the first lien of
the mortgage is also risk-free. On default, the entire loss of principal is borne by
the residual tranche, which correponds to the second lien of the mortgage. The
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recovery rate of the second lien is only 1.67%. Therefore the first lien (senior
tranche) is risk-free when the second lien (residual tranche) is large enough to
absorb the loss of principal on default.
2.3.2 Heterogeneous Pool
This section extends the analysis to heterogeneous pools, which contain two
different types of mortgages. After appropriate modification, the analysis here
also applies to pools with more than two types of mortgages. The two mortgages
differ in borrower default costs. The default costs faced by the borrower of the
first mortgage are lower. The other exogenous characteristics of the two mortgages
are identical. In particular, one aggregate geometric Brownian motion governs
the evolution of housing services for both the mortgaged properties. The cost of
exercising the default option is lower for the first borrower, so his default threshold
is higher. Therefore, contingent on default, the first mortgage is always terminated
earlier. I refer to the first and second mortgages as early default and late default
mortgages. Variables associated with early and late default mortgages are indexed
by e and l. Since the early default mortgage has a higher default threshold, the
value of the property when the mortgage is terminated is higher. Therefore the
lender’s net recovery on this mortgage is higher; recall that lender default costs
are identical across mortgages.
Consider a pool created by combining early and late default mortgages; nor-
malize the total number of mortgages in the pool to one. The proportion of early
default mortgages in the pool is exogenous; it is denoted by η ∈ (0, 1). The
proportion of late default mortgages is 1 − η. Denote the value of the pool by
67
Chapter 2. Pricing Default Risk in Mortgage Backed Securities
Vp(t, x(t)). Time is a state variable when the pool is heterogeneous because the
composition of the pool changes over time, if borrowers default. The value of the
pool is the weighted average of the value of the underlying mortgages that have
not defaulted. It equals the weighted average of both the mortgage values before
the early default event; the value of the late default mortgage weighted by 1− η
after the early default event; zero after the late default event.
Vp(t, x(t)) =

ηMe(x(t)) + (1− η)Ml(x(t)) if 0 ≤ t < τe
(1− η)Ml(x(t)) if τe ≤ t < τl
0 if τl ≤ t.
(2.13)
Denote the coupon on the pool by cp(t). It is the weighted average of the
coupons on the underlying mortgages that have not defaulted. It equals ηce +
(1−η)cl before the early default event; (1−η)cl after the early default event; zero
after the late default event. The initial yield on the pool is cp(0)/Vp(0, 1), and
the yield at the time of early default is cp(τe)/Vp(τe, δe). The yield on the pool
can also be expressed as the weighted average of the underlying mortgage yields;
the same holds for yields spreads on the pool. At the time of early default, the
recovery on the pool is the recovery on early default mortgages weighted by their
proportion, Rpe = ηMe(δe); this is the early recovery on the pool. Similarly the
late recovery on the pool is Rpl = (1 − η)Ml(δl). The sum of the early and late
recoveries on the pool, Rp = Rpe + Rpl, is the total recovery on the pool. The
recovery rate of the pool is its total recovery divided by its value at origination,
Rp/Vp(0, 1).
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Mortgage pass-throughs are bonds that represent pro rata claims to the cash
flows of the pool. The total value of pass-throughs at origination equals Vp(0, 1).
These bonds receive the initial coupon cp(0) until the early default event. The
lender uses the early recovery on the pool to buy back bonds at their market value.
Bondholders are indifferent to selling their bonds at this value. The total value of
the bonds that remain outstanding is Vp(τe, δe). These bonds receive cp(τe) until
the late default event. The lender uses the late recovery on the pool to buy back
the remaining bonds at their market value. The initial yield on pass-throughs is
cp(0)/Vp(0, 1) and the yield at the time of early default is cp(τe)/Vp(τe, δe). The
yield on pass-throughs is always greater than the risk-free rate r because these
bonds carry default risk.
Tranches.– As in the case of a homogeneous pool, the lender divides the pool
by value into a senior tranche and a residual tranche. He then sells bonds that
are pro rata claims to cash flows on each tranche. The senior tranche has first
claims to all cash flows on the pool, whereas the residual tranche is the first to
bear all losses. This division of cash flows is done so as to make the senior tranche
relatively safe and the residual tranche relatively risky.
The proportional value of the senior tranche at origination exogenous; it is
denoted by 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Let Vs(t, x(t)) denote the value of the senior tranche.
The initial value of the senior tranche is Vs(0, 1) = θVp(0, 1). Let cs(t) denote the
coupon on the senior tranche. The cash flows to the tranche are as follows. The
tranche receives its original coupon cs(0) until the early default event. The lender
uses the early recovery on the pool to buy back senior bonds at their market value.
The amount allocated towards the buyback is referred to as the early recovery on
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the senior tranche; it is denoted Rse. The fraction of senior bonds outstanding
after the buyback is
qs ≡ Vs(τe, δe)
Vs(τe, δe) +Rse
, (2.14)
where Vs(τe, δe) is the market value of the senior tranche after the buyback. The
lender attempts to pay the outstanding senior bonds their original coupon. If
he cannot do so, then he forwards the entire coupon on the pool to the tranche.
Therefore, the coupon on the senior tranche at the time of early default is
cs(τe) = min{qscs(0), cp(τe)}. (2.15)
Senior bonds receive this coupon until the late default event. The lender uses the
late recovery on the pool to buy back the remaining senior bonds at their market
value. The amount allocated towards the buyback is termed the late recovery on
the senior tranche; it is denoted Rsl.
The total recovery on the senior tranche is defined as the sum of the early and
late recoveries; it is denoted Rs. The senior tranche has first claims on the cash
flows to the pool. Therefore the entire early recovery on the pool is used to buy
back senior bonds, unless the recovery exceeds the par value of the senior tranche.
The early recovery on the senior tranche is Rse = min{Vs(0, 1), Rpe}. The entire
late recovery on the pool is used to buy back senior bonds, unless the recovery
exceeds the par value of the outstanding senior bonds. The late recovery on the
tranche is Rsl = min{Vs(0, 1) − Rse, Rpl}. In both cases, the minimum operator
ensures that the total recovery on the senior tranche does not exceed its par value.
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The recovery rate of the senior tranche is its total recovery divided by the par
value, Rs/Vs(0, 1).
As in the case of the homogeneous pool, the recovery on the pool is adequate
if it is large enough buy back the senior tranche at its par value, Rs = Vs(0, 1).
Otherwise, the recovery is inadequate and Rs = Rp. The recovery rate of the
tranche is one when the recovery on the pool is adequate, and less than one when
the recovery is inadequate. In both cases, the recovery rate of the tranche is
greater than the recovery rate of the pool. The coupon on the pool is adequate if
it is large enough to continue paying the outstanding senior bonds their original
coupon after the early buyback, cs(τe) = qscs(0). Otherwise, if qscs(0) > cp(τe)
then the coupon is inadequate and cs(τe) = cp(τe).
The value of the residual tranche is Vj(t, x(t)) = Vp(t, x(t)) − Vs(t, x(t)). Its
coupon is cj(t) = cp(t)− cs(t). The coupon on the residual tranche after the early
default event is positive when the coupon on the pool is adequate, and zero when
the coupon is inadequate. The early recovery on the tranche is Rje = Rpe − Rse
and the late recovery is Rjl = Rpl−Rsl. The total recovery is Rj = Rp−Rs. The
total recovery on the residual tranche is positive when the recovery on the pool
is adequate, and zero when the recovery is inadequate. The recovery rate of the
residual tranche is less than the recovery rate of the pool.
Equilibrium.– The CMO market is perfectly competitive, so the lender makes
zero expected profits in equilibrium. The equilibrium coupon schedule on the
senior tranche is such that this tranche is issued at par; the coupon schedule
on the residual tranche follows. The equilibrium senior coupons cs(0) and cs(τe)
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satisfy
Vs(0, 1) = E0
[∫ τe
0
e−rtcs(0)dt
]
+ E0
[
e−rτeRse
]
+ E0
[
e−rτeVs(τe, δe)
]
, (2.16)
Vs(τe, δe) = Eτe
[∫ τl
τe
e−r(t−τe)cs(τe)dt
]
+ Eτe
[
e−r(τl−τe)Rsl
]
. (2.17)
where cs(τe) is given by (2.15). According to (2.16) the market value of the
senior tranche at origination is the expected discounted value of its initial coupon
payments, its early recovery Rse, and its market value at the time of early default
Vs(τe, δe). Similarly (2.17) states that the market value of the senior tranche at
the time of early default is the expected discounted value of its remaining coupon
payments and the late recovery payment Rsl.
The permutations of adequate coupon and adequate recovery on the pool sug-
gest four types of equilibria: adequate coupon, adequate recovery; inadequate
coupon, adequate recovery; adequate coupon, inadequate recovery; and inade-
quate coupon, inadequate recovery. Next I discuss when each type of equilibrium
arises, if at all, and characterize the coupon schedule of the senior tranche in that
equilibrium.
First I focus on cases in which the recovery on the pool is adequate. Consider
the case in which the senior tranche is so small that the entire tranche is bought
back at its par value when early default mortgages are terminated. The par value
of this tranche must be less than the early recovery on the pool, Vs(0, 1) ≤ Rpe.
Equivalently, let θ1 denote the threshold at which the proportional value of the
senior tranche is such that Vs(0, 1) = Rpe; the threshold is θ1 = Rpe/Vp(0, 1). The
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entire senior tranche is bought back at the time of early default at its par value
when θ ≤ θ1.
Now consider a senior tranche whose proportional value is slightly larger than
θ1. The par value of this tranche is slightly larger than Rpe. Therefore the en-
tire tranche is not bought back at the time of early default. Instead the fraction
Rpe/Vs(0, 1) is bought back at the time of early default, while the fraction remain-
ing is bought back at its par value at the time of late default. The early and late
recoveries on the senior tranche are Rse = Rpe and Rsl = Vs(0, 1) − Rse. The
tranche continues to be bought back at its par value at the two default events as
long as the late recovery on the pool is large enough to do so, Rpl ≥ Vs(0, 1)−Rpe.
Rearranging terms in the inequality, the recovery on the pool is adequate as long
as the par value of the senior tranche is less than the total recovery on the pool.
Let θ2 denote the threshold at which the proportional value of the senior tranche
is such that Vs(0, 1) = Rp; the threshold is θ2 = Rp/Vp(0, 1). The recovery on the
pool is adequate for all θ ≤ θ2.
Motivated by my finding for one-mortgage pools, I conjecture that the yield
on senior bonds equals the risk-free rate r when the recovery on the pool is ad-
equate. The conjecture is correct; see Appendix A. The intuition is identical
to the one-mortgage case: If the recovery is adequate, then senior bonds carry
no default risk because the total recovery on these bonds equals their initial
principal. Therefore the equilibrium yield on senior bonds must equal the risk
free rate r at all times. This equilibrium is the risk-free equilibrium. (Note
that the equilibrium regions are labeled based on the characteristics of the senior
tranche only.) Next I determine whether the coupon on the pool is adequate
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or inadequate in the risk-free equilibrium. Recall that the yield on the pool is
always greater than r. The value of the senior tranche is always less than the
value of the pool, Vs(t, x(t)) ≤ Vp(t, x(t)). Together these two observations imply
cp(t) ≥ rVp(t, x(t)) ≥ rVs(t, x(t)). Therefore the coupon on the pool is adequate
in the risk-free equilibrium.
To establish the uniqueness of the risk-free equilibrium for θ ∈ [0, θ2], note
that the definition of cs(τe) in (2.15) implies that the coupon on outstanding
senior bonds cannot rise at the early default date. The coupon either falls or
remains constant at the early default date. Suppose that the coupon falls, then
cs(τe) = cp(τe) by definition. This case cannot be an equilibrium when θ ∈ [0, θ2]
because it allows arbitrage: an investor can borrow Vs(0, 1)−Rse at the risk-free
rate r, purchase the senior tranche, and earn a rate of return greater than r until
the late default event (Recall that the yield on the pool is always greater than
r and Vs(t, x(t)) ≤ Vp(t, x(t)), implying that the yield on senior bonds is greater
than r when cs(τe) = cp(τe).) At the time of late default he will receive a recovery
of Vs(0, 1)− Rse, which he can use to pay back his debt. Similarly, if the coupon
on senior bonds is constant, then the yield must equal r to rule out arbitrage.
The uniqueness of the risk-free equilibrium for θ ∈ [0, θ2] implies that there are
no equilibria for which the recovery on the pool is adequate while the coupon is
inadequate.
If θ > θ2, then the recovery on the pool is inadequate. To complete the
classification of equilibria, I need to divide the interval (θ2, 1] into a region in which
the coupon on the pool is adequate, and another region in which the coupon is
inadequate. Consider a senior tranche whose proportional value is slightly larger
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than θ2. The initial coupon on this tranche is slightly larger than r. After the
early default event, the coupon on the pool is large enough to pay the outstanding
senior bonds their initial coupon; the coupon on the pool is adequate. As the
proportional size of the senior tranche increases, its recovery rate decreases and so
the required coupon on the tranche increases. The largest value of θ for which the
coupon on the pool is adequate is found by solving qscs(0) = cp(τe). The resulting
threshold, denoted θ3, is
θ3 = 1− (1− δ
m
e )ηce/r
Me(1)
(
1− cl/Ml(δe)
ce/Me(δe)
)
. (2.18)
The threshold (2.18) lies within the interval (θ2, 1) provided ce/Me(δe) ≥ cl/Ml(δe);
see Appendix A. Since Me(1) = Ml(1), the required condition on the underlying
mortgages holds when the initial yield on the early default mortgage is greater
than that on the late default mortgage, ce/Me(1) ≥ cl/Ml(1), and the net recovery
on the early default mortgage is less than the value of late default mortgage at the
same date, Me(δe) ≤Ml(δe). From here on, I assume that ce/Me(δe) ≥ cl/Ml(δe).
Therefore, when θ ∈ (θ2, θ3], the proportional value of the senior tranche at origi-
nation is small enough to leave the senior coupon unchanged after the early default
event; the coupon on the pool is adequate. When θ ∈ (θ3, 1], however, the propor-
tional value of the senior tranche at origination is so large that the entire coupon
on the pool goes to this tranche after the early default event; the coupon on the
pool is inadequate.
In summary, all thresholds lie within the interval (0, 1) and satisfy θ1 ≤ θ2 < θ3.
They divide the unit interval into four equilibrium regions. When θ ∈ [0, θ1], the
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senior tranche is so small that all the principal on this tranche is repaid at the
early default date. This region is risk-free region I. When θ ∈ (θ1, θ2], the senior
tranche is still small enough that all the principal on this tranche is repaid on
default. In this case, however, part of the principal remains outstanding after the
early default date. The outstanding principal is repaid at the late default date.
This region is risk-free region II. When θ ∈ (θ2, θ3], the senior tranche is so large
that its entire principal cannot be repaid on default. It is, however, small enough
that the senior bonds outstanding after the early default event continue to receive
their initial coupon. This region is the low-risk region. When θ ∈ (θ3, 1], the
senior tranche is so large that its entire principal cannot be repaid on default, and
the coupon on outstanding senior bonds drops after the early default event. This
region is the high-risk region.
Now that the classification of equilibria is complete, I solve for the equilibrium
coupons in the low-risk and the high-risk equilibria; recall that the coupons for
the risk-free equilibrium are such that the yield on the senior tranche equals r. In
the low-risk equilibrium, the early and late recoveries on the senior tranche and
the pool are identical. The coupon on this tranche at the time of early default is
cs(τe) = qscs(0). (2.19)
Equations (2.16), (2.17), and (2.19) form a system of nonlinear equations in cs(0),
cs(τe), and Vs(τe, δe). The equilibrium senior coupon schedule is obtained by
solving this system numerically.
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The early and late recoveries on the senior tranche and the pool are also
identical in the high-risk equilibrium. In this equilibrium, however, the coupon on
the pool after the early default event is distributed pro rata among the outstanding
senior bonds, cs(τe) = cp(τe). Since cs(τe) is known, I find Vs(τe, δe) using (2.17)
and then solve (2.16) for cs(0) to obtain
cs(0) =
r
1− δme
[
Vs(0, 1)−
(
Rpe +
cp(τe)
r
)
δme −
(
Rpl − cp(τe)
r
)
δml
]
. (2.20)
The equilibrium characteristics of the residual tranche follow from those of the
senior tranche. In risk-free region I, the early recovery on the residual tranche is
strictly positive, except when θ = θ1. After the early default event, the residual
tranche mimics the pool: its coupon equals cp(τe) and its late recovery equals Rpl.
In risk-free region II, the early recovery on the residual tranche is zero. The late
recovery is strictly positive, except when θ = θ2. The coupon on this tranche is
strictly positive for t ≤ τl. It does, however, drop after the early default event. In
the low-risk region, the early and late recoveries on the residual tranche are both
zero. In this region, the coupon on the residual tranche is strictly positive for
t ≤ τl, except when θ = θ3. The coupon in this region also drops after the early
default event. In the high-risk region, the early and late recoveries on the residual
tranche are zero, and its coupon drops to zero after the early default event.
Numerical Examples.– This subsection illustrates various characteristics of
the model using numerical examples. It presents examples of yields on low-risk
and high-risk senior bonds. It shows how the equilibrium thresholds θ1, θ2, and θ3
change with the composition of the pool η . Finally, it shows how model implied
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Early default mortgage Late default mortgage
(kβe = 0) (kβl = 4)
LTV 80% 80%
Default threshold 67.57% 53.06%
Coupon 1.524 1.477
Initial yield 7.62% 7.38%
Recovery rate 74.46% 56.32%
Table 2.2: Benchmark mortgage characteristics
yields for low-risk senior bonds change with the securitization parameters θ and
η. The parameter values are as in the numerical example for the homogeneous
pool; see Table 2.1. Borrower default costs for early and late default borrowers
are set to zero and twenty percent of the mortgage size, kβe = 0 and kβl = 4.
Lender default costs are set to ten percent of the mortgage size, kλ = 2.
Table 2.2 summarizes the implied characteristics of early and late default mort-
gages. In equilibrium, borrowers with early default mortgages terminate their
mortgage when house prices drop to 67.57% of the purchase price. Borrowers
with late default mortgages terminate their mortgage when house prices drop
to 53.06% of the purchase price. The recovery rates on early and late default
mortgages are 74.46% and 56.32%; the equilibrium coupons are ce = 1.524 and
cl = 1.477; the equilibrium initial yields are 7.62% and 7.38%. The higher initial
yield on the early default mortgage reflects the fact that the default risk of this
mortgage is higher.
In the benchmark, the proportion of early and late default mortgages in the
pool are equal, η = 0.5. Once the composition of the pool is set, other character-
istics of the pool are implied by those of the underlying mortgages. The implied
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origination value is Vp(0, 1) = 20. The initial coupon is cp(0) = 1.500. The initial
yield on the pool is 7.50%. The value at the early default event is Vp(τe, δe) = 8.42.
The coupon after the early default event is cp(τe) = 0.738, so the yield at the early
default date is 8.77%. The early and late recoveries are Rpe = 7.45 and Rpl = 5.63.
The total recovery is Rp = 13.08. The recovery rate is 65.39%.
Once the composition of the pool and the underlying mortgage parameters are
chosen, the threshold for each type of equilibrium can be determined. The first
threshold is θ1 = 0.3723. All senior bonds are bought back at the early default
event if the initial value of the senior tranche, in proportion to that of the pool, is
less than 37.23%. The second threshold is θ2 = 0.6539. Senior bonds are risk-free
if the proportional value of the senior tranche at origination is less than 65.39%.
When the proportional value is between 37.23% and 65.39% some risk-free senior
bonds remain outstanding after the early default event; these bonds are bought
back at par at the time of late default. The third threshold is θ3 = 0.9422. If
the proportional value of the senior tranche at origination is strictly larger than
65.39%, but less than 94.22%, then senior bonds are low-risk in equilibrium. On
the other hand, if this value is strictly larger than 94.22%, then senior bonds are
high-risk in equilibrium.
Table 2.3 presents examples of each type of equilibrium. The senior tranche
is risk-free in equilibrium if its initial value is 40% of the pool’s initial value. The
implied initial value of the senior tranche is Vs(0, 1) = 8. The coupons on the
senior tranche are cs(0) = 0.560 and cs(τe) = 0.039. Regardless of the evolution
of house prices the yield on senior bonds is r = 7% until the late default event.
The early recovery on the senior tranche equals the early recovery on the pool,
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Rse = 7.45. The late recovery on the senior tranche is Rsl = 0.55. The recovery
rate of this tranche is 100%.
The residual tranche is 60% of the pool at origination, Vj(0, 1) = 12. The
implied initial coupon on residual bonds is cj(0) = 0.940. In contrast to senior
bond yields, residual bond yields depend on the evolution of house prices. Prior
to the late default event, residual bond yields decrease if house prices increase
and vice versa. This decrease in the residual bond yield reflects the decline in
the default probability due to the increase in house prices. The initial yield on
residual bonds is 7.84%. The initial yield spread on residual bonds is higher
than the spread on the pool because all the default risk has been directed to the
residual tranche. The coupon on the residual tranche at the early default event
is cj(τe) = 0.700. The residual bond yield at the early default event increases to
8.89%. This increase in the residual bond yield reflects the increased likelihood
of the late default event. Since the residual tranche absorbs all the losses due to
default, the recovery rate of this tranche is only 42.32%.
The low-risk equilibrium occurs when θ = 0.80. The implied initial value of the
senior tranche is Vs(0, 1) = 16. Unlike risk-free senior bonds, the yield on low-risk
senior bonds depends on the evolution of house prices; the yield and house prices
are inversely related. The yield on low-risk senior bonds approaches r = 7% only
when house prices rise unboundedly. The initial coupon on the senior tranche is
cs(0) = 1.158. The initial yield on senior bonds is 7.24%; the yield spread of 24
basis points reflects the fact that low-risk senior bonds carry default risk. The
yield increases to 8.03% at the early default event. The early and late recoveries
on the senior tranche and the pool are identical. The recovery rates, however, are
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not. The recovery rate of the pool is 65.39%, whereas the recovery rate of the
senior tranche is 81.74%. The recovery rate of the senior tranche is higher because
the residual tranche is the first to absorb losses.
Once the characteristics of the senior tranche in the low-risk equilibrium are
determined, those of the residual tranche follow. The initial value of the residual
tranche is Vj(0, 1) = 4. The initial yield on residual bonds is 8.55%, and the early
default yield on these bonds is 12.34%. The recovery rate of the residual tranche
is zero in the low-risk equilibrium.
The high-risk equilibrium occurs when θ = 0.95. The initial value of the senior
tranche is Vs(0, 1) = 19. Since senior bonds are high-risk, the coupon on these
bonds after the early default event equals the coupon on the pool, cs(τe) = 0.738.
The value of the senior tranche at the early default event is Vs(τe, δe) = 8.42. The
initial coupon on the senior tranche is cs(0) = 1.406. The initial and early default
yields on senior bonds are 7.40% and 8.77%. The early and late recoveries on
the senior tranche and the pool are identical. The recovery rates on the pool and
the senior tranche are 65.39% and 68.83%. The equilibrium characteristics of the
senior tranche approach those of the pool as θ increases. When θ = 1, the senior
tranche and the pool are identical.
The initial value of the residual tranche in the high-risk equilibrium is Vj(0, 1) =
1. The coupon on residual bonds is cj(0) = 0.094. The initial yield is 9.42%. In
the high-risk equilibrium, the residual tranche stops receiving payments after the
early default event.
Next I show how the model solution changes as the composition of the pool
changes; the composition is determined by η. Figure 2.3 shows the equilibrium
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Figure 2.3: Equilibrium regions for admissible values of η and θ.
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thresholds θ1, θ2, and θ3 as functions of η. This figure partitions the unit square
formed by admissible values of η and θ into four equilibrium regions: risk-free
region I, risk-free region II, low-risk region, and high-risk region. To begin with, I
restrict attention to η ∈ (0, 1). The dashed line is the threshold θ1 = Rpe/Vp(0, 1),
where Rpe = ηMe(δe). Since Me(1) = Ml(1), the initial value of the pool does not
change with η, Vp(0, 1) = Me(1). Therefore θ1 is linear in η with slope equal to
the recovery rate of the early default mortgage Me(δe)/Me(1). As η increases, the
early recovery on the pool increases so more cash is available to buy back senior
bonds at the time of early default. The size of the senior tranche that can be
bought back at par at the time of early default increases. Since Vp(0, 1) does not
change with η, the proportional size of the senior tranche that can be bought back
at the time of early default increases with η.
Similarly, θ2 = Rp/Vp(0, 1) is linear in η, and its slope equals the difference
between the recovery rate of early and late default mortgages, Me(δe)/Me(1) −
Ml(δl)/Ml(1). This difference is positive because the default threshold, and so the
recovery, of early default mortgages is higher. As η increases, the weight of early
default mortgages in the pool increases so the total recovery on the pool increases.
Therefore, the size of the senior tranche that can be bought back at its par value
increases.
Equation (2.18) shows that the threshold θ3 is linearly decreasing in η; recall
that ce/Me(δe) ≥ cl/Ml(δe) by assumption. An increase in η has two opposing
effects — it increases the early recovery on the pool Rpe, and it decreases the
coupon on the pool after the early default event cp(τe). The increase in the early
recovery implies a higher θ3 because more senior bonds can be bought back at
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the time of early default. The decrease in the cp(τe), however, implies a lower
θ3 because the senior tranche should be smaller for outstanding senior bonds to
continue receiving their initial coupon after the early default event. The second
effect dominates in the example considered.
The analysis so far has been restricted to η ∈ (0, 1). Now I extend it to include
the endpoints of the interval. When η equals zero or one the pool contains one
type of mortgage only, so the analysis in section 2.3.1 applies. The analysis in that
section can be imbedded into the analysis here by setting the early and late default
mortgage variables equal to each other. For example, ce = cl and Me(δe) = Ml(δe)
implies that θ3 = 1 at the end points. To maintain consistency with the two-
mortgage pool framework, I assume that the pool experiences two default events
when η equals zero or one, with one default event being inconsequential. If η = 0,
then the pool contains late default mortgages only. Therefore the early default
event is inconsequential: The coupon on the pool is unchanged, the early recovery
on the pool is zero, and no senior bonds are bought back. All senior bonds continue
to receive their initial coupon after the early default event. The coupon on the
pool is adequate for all θ ∈ [0, 1]; see Figure 2.3. When η = 1 the pool contains
early default mortgages only; the late default event is inconsequential. In this
case, the early recovery on the pool Rpe equals the total recovery Rp. Therefore
the thresholds θ1 and θ2 coincide. When η = 1, the threshold θ3 also equals one;
set cl = ce and Ml(δe) = Me(δe) in (2.18).
Figure 2.4 shows equilibrium initial yields on the senior tranche as a function
of η, for various values of θ. The kink on an initial yield curve indicates the value
of η at which the senior tranches switches equilibrium regions. For example, when
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Figure 2.4: Equilibrium initial yields as a function of η.
θ = 0.60, the senior tranche switches from the low-risk equilibrium to the risk-free
equilibrium at the kink. When θ = 0.90, the senior tranches switches from the
low-risk equilibrium to the high-risk equilibrium at the kink. Depending on the
value of θ, an increase in η can either increase or decrease the initial yield on
senior bonds. To understand the effect of an increase in η on the yield, calculate
the yield at the end points η = 0 and η = 1; the yield for η ∈ (0, 1) is a weighted
average of the yield at the end points. The analysis of homogeneous pools applies
at the endpoints. When η = 0, the pool consists of late default mortgages only.
When η = 1, the pool consists of early default mortgages only. An increase in
η from zero to one is equivalent to a decrease in borrower default costs for a
homogeneous pool; borrower default costs decrease from kβl = 4 to kβe = 0. As
discussed earlier, a decrease in borrower default costs has two opposing effects: it
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increases the probability of default which raises the initial yield, and it increases
the lender’s net recovery which lowers the initial yield. The equilibrium initial
yield at η = 1 maybe less than or greater than the yield at η = 0, depending
on which effect dominates. The figure shows that the initial yield on the senior
tranche is increasing in η for some θ, and decreasing in η for others.
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Figure 2.5: Equilibrium initial yields as a function of θ.
Figure 2.5 shows equilibrium initial yields on senior bonds as a function of θ,
for various η.9 For a given η, the initial yield on senior bonds is unambiguously
increasing in θ. An increase in θ reduces the size of the residual tranche, so the
senior tranche’s buffer against default losses is decreased and its losses on default
increase. The initial yield increases with θ to reflect the increase in the default
9I only show the initial yield for θ ∈ [0.5, 1]; initial yield equals r for all θ ∈ [0, 0.5)
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risk of senior bonds. The kink on each initial yield curve shows the value of θ at
which the senior tranche switches equilibrium regions. The first kink shows the
switch from the risk-free region to the low-risk region. The second kink shows the
switch from the low-risk region to the high-risk region. The high-risk equilibrium
is ruled out when there is only one type of mortgage in the pool, so the initial
yield curves for η = 0 and η = 1 only have one kink.
This graph also provides a different perspective on how the interaction between
the two securitization parameters θ and η affects the initial yield on senior bonds.
Consider θ = 0.70. In this case, an increase in η lowers the initial yield because
the recovery effect dominates the probability effect; the senior tranche is risk-free
when η = 1. Now consider θ = 0.90. In this case, as increase in η increases
the initial yield because the probability effect dominates the recovery effect. The
initial yield curves cross at the value of θ at which the two opposing effects cancel
each other out. The crossing point is found by equating the initial yield on senior
bonds when η = 0 to the yield when η = 1 and solving for θ; the initial yield
on senior bonds is given by (2.12). In the benchmark parametrization, the initial
yield curves cross when θ = 0.848.10
2.4 Quantitative Exercises
This section shows model implied security prices, yields, and net monthly re-
turns for house prices observed in the data between July 2006 and July 2011. I
10The initial yield curves for η = 0 and η = 1 cross provided the initial yield on the early
default mortgage is higher than the initial yield on the late default mortgage. This condition is
satisfied in the numerical example considered; the initial yield on the early default mortgage is
7.62% and the yield on the late default mortgage is 7.38%.
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conduct this exercise using the Case-Shiller house price index. I present the find-
ings for three different indexes: the composite-20 index, the Las Vegas metropoli-
tan area index, and the Denver metropolitan area index. These indexes were
chosen because the default experience of the benchmark pool is different for each
index — only early default mortgages are terminated according to the composite-
20 index; both early and late default mortgages are terminated according to the
Las Vegas index; none of the mortgages are terminated according to the Denver
index.
Using a hand collected dataset on subprime MBS, Park (2010) showed that
the average LTV for non-agency securitizations during 2004-2007 was about 78%.
Park (2010) also showed that the subordination for AAA-rated tranches during
2004-2007 ranged from 16.6% to 22.8%, with an average of 20.8%. Usually senior
tranches of a CMO were rated AAA, so I assume that these tranches correspond to
the senior tranche in the model. Motivated by the data, the low-risk equilibrium
with θ = 0.80 is the preferred specification for the quantitative exercise; all other
parameters equal their values in the numerical example presented earlier.
Figure 2.6a shows the composite-20 index (bold solid line), the Las Vegas
metropolitan area index (solid line), and the Denver metropolitan area index
(dashed line) from January 2000 to July 2011; the composite-20 index aggregates
house price information from twenty metropolitan areas. The composite-20 index
displays rapid house price appreciation until July 2006. According to this index,
house prices doubled between January 2000 and July 2006. House prices in the
Las Vegas metropolitan area more than doubled during the same time period;
house prices in July 2006 were approximately 2.4 times their January 2001 values.
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House price increases in the Denver metropolitan area were comparatively modest;
they increased by about 30% in this time period. After reaching their peak in
July 2006, house prices declined according to all three indexes. According to the
composite-20 index, house prices declined at an average rate of 0.61% per month.
By July 2011, the composite-20 index was 30.87% lower than its peak value. The
Las Vegas index declined from its peak at an average rate of 1.47% per month,
and was 59.25% lower than its peak value. The Denver index declined at a rate
of 0.17% per month, and was 10.19% lower than its peak.
In order to get the house price index data within the model framework, I
calculate the housing service flow implied by the data; see Figure 2.6b. I normalize
the flow of housing services to be one on July 2006, the date when housing services
peak. This date will be the origination date for both mortgages in the pool.
As noted earlier, the realization of the composite-20 index is such that only
early default mortgages are terminated. Figure 2.7a shows the yield on the pool
(solid line) and the senior tranche (bold solid line), as implied by this index.
The figure also shows the early default date. As mentioned earlier, the bonds
on the pool can be thought of as mortgage pass-through bonds. The yield on
both mortgage pass-throughs and senior bonds rises as house prices fall because
the likelihood of mortgage default increases. The yield on pass-throughs drops
discontinuously at the early default date because the coupon on these bonds drops
at this date. Since senior bonds are low-risk, the yield on these bonds is unchanged
at the early default date.
Figure 2.7b shows the market value of a mortgage pass-through, a senior bond,
and a residual bond for the composite-20 index. The original bond value has
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Figure 2.7: Composite-20 index
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been normalized to 100. Notice that the value of each bond is continuous. As
expected, the values decline as house prices fall. The default risk of the pool
is divided disproportionately among the tranches to create relatively safe senior
bonds, and relatively risky residual bonds. The bond values reflects this division
— senior bond values are always above, and residual bond values are always below,
the pass-through values. The model implied values of pass-throughs declined by
19.14% between July 2006 and July 2011. During the same time period, senior
and residual bond values declined by 8.84% and 61.85%.
Figure 2.7c shows the net monthly return on all three bonds according to the
composite-20 index. The net return was calculated as the sum of the monthly
coupon payments and capital gains divided by the bond price last month. As the
figure shows, the variability of monthly returns is highest for the residual tranche.
The net monthly returns on this tranche range from −12% to 5%. In contrast,
the net monthly return on senior bonds stays around 1%.
Figure 2.8 shows model implied yields, bond prices, and net monthly returns
for housing services realized in the Las Vegas metropolitan area. The key difference
between the Las Vegas index and the composite-20 index is that both early and
late default mortgages are terminated according to the Las Vegas index. As
expected, the realized pass-through and senior bond yields increase over time
for this metropolitan area. The initial yield on pass-throughs is 7.50%, while the
realized yield on these bonds one month before to the late default event is 12.69%.
Similarly, the initial yield on senior bonds is 7.24%, and the realized yield on these
bonds one month before to the late default event is 9.79%. The market value of
all three bonds declines monotonically over time; bond values are normalized to
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Figure 2.8: Las Vegas metropolitan area index
94
Chapter 2. Pricing Default Risk in Mortgage Backed Securities
100 at the origination date. The mortgae pass-through is worth 79.62 at the early
default event, and 54.79 at the late default event. The senior and residual bonds
are worth 90.29 and 36.98 at the time of early default. The senior bond is worth
73.81 one month before late default event. Since the recovery on the residual bond
is zero, it is only worth 2.37 one month before the late default event. According
to the Las Vegas index, the net monthly returns on residual bonds are negative
throughout the time period studied. In contrast, the net monthly return on senior
bonds stays around 0% throughout, reaching its lowest value around −4% before
the late default event.
Figure 2.9 shows yields, bonds prices, and net monthly returns for the Denver
metropolitan area. Denver’s index differs from the composite-20 and the Las
Vegas index because neither the early default nor the late default mortgages are
terminated according to this index. As with the other two indexes, realized bond
yields for this region increase over time. However, the size of the increase is
smaller. The yield on pass-throughs increases from 7.50% to 7.75%, and the yield
on senior bonds increases from 7.24% to 7.35%. Figure 2.9b shows that senior
bond prices do not respond much to house price changes. In contrast, residual
bond prices are very sensitive to house price changes. According to the Denver
index, the net monthly returns fluctuate around 0.5% for all three bonds. As
expected, the net return on senior bonds is close to 0.5%. However, the net
return on residual bonds is more volatile; the lowest return is around −3% and
the highest is around 4%.
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Figure 2.9: Denver metropolitan area index
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2.5 CMO-squared
In practice, tranches from various CMOs are often combined together into a
new pool. The pool is again divided into various tranches, and bonds on these
tranches are sold in capital markets. Since the underlying assets of the pool are
tranches of an existing CMO, the resulting CMO is called a CMO-squared. Prior
to the crisis, CMO-squared were used extensively as collateral in the shadow bank-
ing system; the total notional amount of CMO-squared issued between 2005-2007
was about $1.25 trillion.11 CMO-squared were usually created from subordinate
tranches of CMOs.12 The basic principle behind creating CMO-squared was also
to divide default risk disproportionately among the tranches; see Gorton (2010)
for an overview. In this section I study the valuation of CMO-squared. I also re-
peat the quantitative exercise of the previous section using the composite-20 index
and calculate model implied CMO-squared yields, prices, and monthly returns.
Even though, in practice, tranches from different CMOs are combined to create
the CMO-squared pool, I assume that CMO-squared are created either from the
senior or from the residual tranche of a single CMO. This assumption allows me to
analyze the interaction between the default risk of mortgages and CMO-squared
in a simple setting. Throughout this section, I focus on the benchmark low-risk
CMO; the analysis with risk-free and high-risk CMOs is similar.
11Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, “Global CDO Issuance and Out-
standing”(April 2013). <www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx>.
12For example, Park (2013b) reports that only 1% of the value of tranches originally rated
AAA was either placed in CMO-squared issued during 2005-2007. In contrast, during the same
time period, this fraction was 47.03% for AA-rated, 68.38% for A-rated, 65.80% for BBB-rated
tranches.
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Consider a pool created from the low-risk senior tranche. The characteristics
of the resulting pool are identical to the low-risk senior tranche: its initial value is
16, initial coupon is 1.158, early recovery is 7.45, value at the early default date is
6.98, coupon after early default is 0.560, and late recovery is 5.63; see Table 2.3.
The cash flows to the CMO-squared pool are re-structured so as to protect
the senior tranche from default risk; the structure of cash flows is as in section
2.3.2. As earlier, the proportional size of the senior tranche of the CMO-squared
created from the new pool is exogenous. In this case, the senior tranche of the
CMO-squared can either be risk-free or low-risk in equilibrium. The high-risk
equilibrium is ruled out because the coupon on the pool does not drop after the
early default event. Consequently, all outstanding senior bonds also continue to
receive their initial coupon after the early default event.
Following the analysis in section 2.3.2, I calculate the thresholds for the equi-
librium regions. The first and the second thresholds are 0.4656 and 0.8174. The
senior tranche of the CMO-squared is risk-free when its proportional value at
origination is less than 81.74%. When the proportional value is less than 46.56%,
the senior tranche is so small that all of it is bought back at the early default
date. When the proportional value is greater than 46.56%, and less than equal to
81.74%, the senior tranche still recovers its entire principal. In this case, however,
some senior bonds remain outstanding after the buy back at the time of early
default. These senior bonds are bought back at their par value if late default
mortgages are terminated. If the proportional value is greater than 81.74%, then
senior CMO-squared bonds are low-risk in equilibrium.
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As a example, consider the case in which the proportional value is 0.80. The
resulting senior CMO-squared tranche is risk-free in equilibrium. The initial value
of this tranche is 12.8. Its coupons are 0.896 at origination, and 0.375 after the
early default event. The early recovery is 7.45 and the late recovery is 5.35. The
implied yield is r = 7% regardless of the evolution of housing services. In this
case, re-tranching has created a senior CMO-squared tranche that is risk-free even
though the CMO used to create it is risky. Note that the proportional value of
the senior CMO-squared tranche is equal to that of its CMO counterpart.
The implied characteristics of the residual tranche of the CMO-squared follow.
The initial value of this tranche is 3.2. Its coupon is 0.262 at origination. The
coupon after the early default event is 0.185. Its value at the early default date
is 1.63. The early recovery is zero, and the late recovery is 0.28. The recovery
rate is 8.75%. The initial yield is 8.19%, and the yield after the early default
event is 11.35%. The yield spread at origination for the residual tranche of the
CMO-squared is 1.19%, whereas the spread for the residual tranche of the CMO
is 1.55%. The lower spread on the residual CMO-squared tranche indicates that
the default risk of this tranche is lower than that of its CMO counterpart.
Now consider a CMO-squared created from the residual tranche of the low-risk
CMO. The characteristics of the resulting pool are identical to the residual tranche
of the low-risk CMO: Its initial value is 4, initial coupon is 0.342, value at the
early default date is 1.44, coupon after early default is 0.178, and total recovery is
0; see Table 2.3. Since the total recovery on the pool is zero, the resulting senior
tranche cannot be risk-free in equilibrium, except in the trivial case in which
the proportional value of this tranche is zero. Since the early recovery on the
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pool is zero, no senior bonds are bought back at the time of early default. The
senior CMO-squared tranche is low-risk in equilibrium as long as its coupon at
origination is less than 0.178, the coupon on the pool after the early default event.
The threshold at which the equilibrium switches from low-risk to high-risk is found
by setting the coupon on the senior tranche equal to 0.178 in (2.16) and (2.17).
The resulting value of the threshold is 0.565. The senior CMO-squared tranche
is low-risk in equilibrium when its proportional value is strictly greater than zero
and less than 56.50%, and high-risk when its proportional value is strictly greater
than 56.50%.
In particular, when the proportional value is 0.80, the resulting senior tranche
is high-risk in equilibrium. The coupon on this tranche is 0.267 at origination
and 0.178 after the early default event. The recovery rate of the senior CMO-
squared tranche is zero, whereas the recovery rate of the senior CMO tranche is
81.74%. The implied initial yield is 8.34%, and the yield at the early default date
is 12.34%. The yield spread at origination on the senior CMO-squared tranche is
1.34%, whereas the yield spread at origination on the senior tranche of the CMO
is 0.24%. The yield spreads reflect the fact that the senior CMO-squared tranche
has higher default risk than the senior tranche of the CMO. The default risk of the
resulting residual tranche is also higher than that of the residual tranche of the
CMO; the yield spread on the residual CMO-squared tranche is 2.42%, whereas
the yield spread on its CMO counterpart is 1.55%.
The analysis in this section highlights that default risk for a CMO tranche
maybe very different from default risk of the corresponding CMO-squared tranche,
even though the relative size of the tranches are identical. In the numerical exam-
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ples presented, the senior CMO-squared tranche created from a low-risk CMO was
risk-free or high-risk in equilibrium, depending on whether the senior or residual
tranche of the CMO was used to create the CMO-squared. It is worth emphasizing
that the different default risk profiles of the CMO-squared bonds were not gen-
erated by differences in the characteristics of the underlying mortgages. Instead,
the different risk profiles were generated solely by the structure of cash flows at
various levels of tranching.
Figure 2.10 shows the yield, bond prices, and net monthly returns on the
CMO-squared created from the residual tranche of the benchmark CMO; I used
the composite-20 index for this exercise. Since the resulting senior tranche is
high-risk, its yield drops discontinuously at the early default date. The yield
on the pool and the senior tranche are identical after early default mortgages
are terminated, so the solid line and the bold solid line overlap in Figure 2.10a.
Figure 2.10b shows that the prices of all bonds decline monotonically. By the
early default date, senior bonds are only worth half of their origination value, and
residual bonds are worthless.
In practice, most CMO-squared are created from CMO tranches that have
not been rated AAA; these tranches together correspond roughly to the residual
tranche of the model CMO. For CMO-squared created from the residual tranche,
the model implies that the senior tranches of CMO-squared have higher default
risk than the senior tranches of CMOs. This prediction of the model seems to be
consistent with average losses observed in the data. Cordell, Huang, and Williams
(2012) report that the average principal write down on publicly traded CMO-
squared issued in 2006 and 2007 was above 93% for all tranches, except the Senior
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AAA tranche which suffered an average write down of 67% in 2006 and 76% in
2007.13 (For comparison, note that the model implied senior CMO-squared bond
values dropped by 50%, and residual bond values declined 100%.) In contrast,
Park (2013a) reports that the average write down on AAA-rated tranches, for
subprime CMOs issued during 2004-2007, was only 0.17%; the average write down
on the lowest-rated BBB tranches was 56.97%. Similarly, Foote, Gerardi, and
Willen (2008b) report that only 10% of AAA-rated CMOs issued in 2006-2007
suffered losses, whereas 90% of CMO-squared issued during the same time period
suffered losses.
Even though the analysis in this section involves considerable simplifications,
it seems to capture how default risk of the underlying mortgages affects valuation
of CMO-squared. Data support the prediction of the model that losses on senior
tranches of CMO-squared created from residual tranches of CMOs maybe quite
large, even though the losses on senior tranches of the same CMOs are small. The
analysis so far has been limited to valuation of CMO-squared. However, it can
easily be extended to incorporate valuation of higher order CMOs. For example,
the analysis implies that a CMO-cubed created from the residual tranche of the
high-risk CMO-squared is such that the entire pool, and so the tranches, becomes
worthless as soon as early default mortgages are terminated.
13A Senior AAA tranche or super senior tranche usually refers to tranches that have subordi-
nate tranches which are AAA rated. By construction, the Senior AAA tranches had the lowest
exposure to default risk.
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(c) Model implied net monthly returns
Figure 2.10: Composite-20 index
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2.6 Credit Default Swaps
A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is insurance against default. The CDS buyer
pays insurance premiums to the CDS seller in exchange for payments contingent
on some pre-specified credit events. CDS were a major asset class before the
financial crisis. According to the annual market survey of the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA), the total amount of CDS outstanding in 2007
was $62.2 trillion. Beginning in 2005, CDS allowed market participants to take
short positions on subprime MBS for the first time.14 The launch of the ABX.HE
index CDS aggregated and revealed the views of market participants on subprime
MBS for the first time. Gorton (2009) argues that this information regarding
the subprime market, along with inadequate information regarding the location
of subprime risk, began the financial crisis of 2007-2008. This section extends the
analysis to the valuation of CDS on mortgage bonds. It also shows the model
implied CDS prices for the Case-Shiller house price index.
In practice, the ABX.HE index is traded as follows. The buyer pays a one time
upfront fee and a fixed index-specific monthly premium to the seller in exchange
for payments contingent on default. CDS prices are quoted as a percentage of
par value. They equal the par value, normalized to 100 at origination, minus the
upfront payment. For example, a price of 60 means that the upfront fee is 40. Since
the insurance premium is fixed, it is the price that changes in response to market
conditions so as to reflect the price of insurance against default. The CDS contract
in the model looks similar. Consider a CDS written on senior bonds. These bonds
14The ISDA standardized its documentation, and successfully launched single-named asset
backed CDS contracts in 2005; see Fender and Scheicher (2009).
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are scheduled to pay cs(0) perpetually. The realized payments, however, depend
on the realization of housing services. The seller of the CDS insures the buyer
against any shortfall in scheduled payments. In return, the buyer pays the seller
a one time upfront fee Is(t, x(t)), and an insurance premium is; the premium is
paid until the late default date.
The following thought experiment shows how to value a CDS contract. Sup-
pose that the buyer of the CDS holds a senior bond, which he turns over to the
seller at the time of the purchase along with the upfront fee; the buyer also pays
the insurance premium until the late default date. In return, the seller pays the
buyer cs(0) until the late default date. The CDS contract is terminated at this
date with the seller giving the buyer an insurance payout of cs(0)/r. The profits
of a CDS seller from insuring one senior bond at some t < τl are
Is(t, x(t)) + Vs(t, x(t)) + Et
[∫ τl
t
e−r(τl−z)isdz
]
− cs(0)
r
, (2.21)
where Is(t, x(t)) is the upfront fee, Vs(t, x(t)) is the market value of the senior
bond, is is the insurance premium, and cs(0)/r is the present value of the insurance
payout. I assume that the insurance is actuarially fair, so CDS sellers make zero
expected profits. The insurance premium is such that the upfront fee is zero at
origination. Once determined, the premium is fixed over lifetime of the CDS. As
default probabilities change, the upfront fee fluctuates so as to keep the insurance
fairly priced.
Even though the discussion so far has been restricted to senior bonds, it car-
ries over to CDS written on mortgage pass-throughs and residual bonds. As a
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numerical example, consider CDS written on each bond of the benchmark low-
risk CMO separately. The insurance premium for mortgage pass-throughs is 0.113,
senior bonds is 0.043, and residual bonds is 0.070. As a percentage of the insured
amount, the premium on pass-throughs is 0.56%, senior bonds is 0.26%, and resid-
ual bonds is 1.74%. Figure 2.11 shows CDS prices on all three securities when
the composite-20 index is fed through the model. The implied prices of all three
CDSs decrease as house prices decrease and default in the near future becomes
more likely.
Jul
2006
Jan
2007
Jul
2007
Jan
2008
Jul
2008
Jan
2009
Jul
2009
Jan
2010
Jul
2010
Jan
2011
Jul
2011
0
20
40
60
80
100
M
od
el
im
pl
ie
d
CD
S
qu
ot
ed
pr
ic
es
Early default
Pool
Senior
Residual
Figure 2.11: Composite-20 index
In practice, prior to the decline in house prices, senior bonds usually carried a
AAA rating at origination. Therefore model implied CDS prices for senior bonds
correspond approximately to the ABX.HE-AAA index. The correspondence is
not exact because the AAA tranches referenced by the corresponding ABX indices
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were not the senior most tranches in their CMOs. Figure 2.11 suggests that prices
of CDS on senior bonds do not fall significantly below the par value; the lowest
model implied price for this CDS is 88.18. In the data, however, the ABX.HE-
AAA indexes were trading significantly below par; see Figure 1 in Stanton and
Wallace (2011). For example, prices of both the 2007 vintages declined steadily
and bottomed out around 20, before recovering steadily to around 40 by July
2010. The quantitative exercise suggests that replicating the steep decline in the
ABX.HE-AAA indices for reasonable parameter values might be difficult. This
finding is in line with recent research on the ABX.AAA-HE index. For example,
Stanton and Wallace (2011) conclude that no reasonable expectation regarding
defaults and recovery rates on mortgages underlying the ABX.AAA-HE index
can account for the observed decline in prices.15
CDS written on residual bonds in the model correspond approximately to
ABX.HE index on bonds that were rated AA, A, BBB, BBB-. The index on
these bonds experienced price declines that were larger than those experienced
by the index on AAA-rated bonds. In fact, ABX.HE indexes for some of the
lowest-rated bonds experienced 100% principal writedowns, and were trading on
an interest-only basis. Figure 2.11 suggests that mortgage default may account for
a large fraction of the price decline in the ABX.HE indexes that were rated below
AAA; the lowest model implied price for CDS written on residual bonds is 26.14.
15Stanton and Wallace (2011) collected detailed data on the individual loans underlying the
ABX.HE index, and calculated the default rates implied by the observed prices. They found
that a prepayment rate of 25% and a recovery rate of 34% implied default rates of 100% at the
observed prices for the ABX.HE-AAA index; the assumed prepayment rate is roughly consistent
with historical prepayment rates on the underlying pools, and the recovery rate is below anything
observed in U.S. mortgage markets. An expected recovery rate greater than 34% implies that
the observed prices are inconsistent with reasonable assumptions regarding default behavior.
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This finding is consistent with the empirical work of Fender and Scheicher (2009).
Using regression analysis, these authors found that indicators of housing market
activity were important for subordinate ABX.HE indexes, but not for AAA and
AA-rated indexes.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper provides a structural model for pricing Mortgage Backed Securi-
ties (MBS) in the presence of mortgage default risk. I model the mortgage de-
fault decision of homeowners, along with essential contractual features of MBSs.
The analysis begins by valuing Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs). For
CMOs made from pools containing two types of mortgages, I find that senior
bondholders may experience no principal or coupon shortfalls, principal shortfalls
only, or both principal and coupon shortfalls; the type of equilibrium depends on
the relative size of the senior tranche. The initial yield on senior bonds increases
as the relative size of the senior tranche increases. In the quantitative exercise I
find that senior bonds lose about 10% of their value and residual bonds lose about
60% of their value when housing services implied by the composite-20 Case-Shiller
index, from July 2006 to July 2011, are fed through the model.
I extend the model to study CMO-squared. Conditional on relative size, I
find that a senior CMO-squared tranche has higher default risk than the senior
tranche of the CMO, when the CMO-squared is created from the residual tranche
of the CMO. According to the quantitative exercise, senior CMO-squared bonds
lose half their value and residual bonds became worthless when the composite-20
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index is fed through the model. I also extend the model to price Credit Default
Swaps on mortgage bonds. The model implied prices for CDS on residual bonds
suggest that default risk was a major driver of the price declines for the ABX.HE
indexes rated below AAA.
The quantitative predictions are not the outcome of a calibrated version of the
model. Calibrating the model directly is challenging because of the presence of
unobservable default cost parameters. The estimation of these parameters from
realized recovery rates along with a calibration of the model is a useful direction
for future research. The calibrated version of the model can be used to analyze
whether mortgage bonds were “mispriced” prior to, or during, the financial crisis.
It would also serve as a benchmark with which to compare the rating agencys’
assessments of MBS. Narratives of the crisis argue, with a considerable element of
hindsight of course, that mispricing and inflated rating both exacerbated, if not
caused, the financial crisis of 2007. The calibrated model can shed light on the
role, or the lack thereof, of these distortions in the financial crisis.
Why lenders choose a particular capital structure for MBS is another im-
portant area for future research. The Miller-Modigliani theorem applies to the
environment laid out here, so lenders are indifferent between all capital structures
for MBS. In practice, however, lenders were particular about the capital structure
of the MBS; see Park (2010) for some evidence that CMO pools that consisted
of mortgages with higher default risk had higher subordination levels. The anal-
ysis also abstracted from informational frictions in the MBS market. Ashcraft
and Schuermann (2008) discuss seven key sources of informational frictions in the
109
Chapter 2. Pricing Default Risk in Mortgage Backed Securities
market for subprime MBS. Analyzing how these frictions affect MBS contractual
features, yields, and equilibrium prices is also an important area for future work.
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Default Risk and Valuation of
Mortgages with Coupon Resets
3.1 Introduction
The buildup to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 saw a large increase in the
popularity of mortgages that featured low coupon payments for the first few years
followed by a reset to a higher coupon payment. Narratives of the crisis often
attribute the high default rates observed during the crisis to the increase in the
mortgage payment after the reset. Even though the effects of payment resets on
mortgage defaults are widely discussed, there are few studies that formally model
borrowers’ incentives to default on mortgages with payment resets. This paper fills
this gap in the literature by studying optimal default in mortgages with payment
resets. It also connects equilibrium yield spreads on these mortgages to initial
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loan-to-value ratios, time until the reset, expected growth rate in house prices,
and house price volatility.
I study optimal default in an environment in which the flow of services from
a house are exogenous and stochastic. Changes in housing services are unfore-
castable. House prices equal the expected discounted value of housing services.
Therefore they are also exogenous and unforecastable. Houses are purchased us-
ing a mortgage loan and a downpayment. The loans feature a coupon reset. The
reset date and the coupons, before and after the reset, are known at the mortgage
origination date; the analysis abstracts from interest rate uncertainty. Borrowers
have the option to default on their mortgage. They exercise this option so as to
maximize home equity. Lenders make zero expected profits. The environment
here adapts Merton (1974) to the analysis of mortgage default. This approach is
standard in the mortgage default literature. For example, Krainer, LeRoy, and
O (2009, KLO from here on) study optimal default by borrowers with fixed rate
mortgages in this environment.
I provide conditions under which the optimal default boundary for a mortgage
with a payment reset has a discontinuity at the reset date. The discontinuity at
the reset date arises when the coupon after the reset is large, compared to the
coupon prior to the reset. The intuition behind this finding can be understood by
considering the incentives of a borrower with a mortgage in which coupon prior to
the reset is zero, and the coupon after the reset is strictly positive. The borrower
would never find it optimal to default before the reset. Default after the reset,
however, is optimal if house prices are sufficiently low. Therefore the default
boundary features a discontinuity at the reset date. The discussion on coupon
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resets usually attributes any jumps in the default boundary at the reset date to
unanticipated payment increases. The model presented here, however, shows that
the default boundary jumps at the reset date even when the post-reset coupon is
known in advance.
Conversely, the default boundary is continuous at the reset date if the post-
reset coupon is not much larger than the pre-reset coupon. This finding shows
that an option based model of mortgage default is qualitatively consistent with
empirical findings on how coupon resets impact mortgage default behavior. For
example, Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008b) find that delinquencies on subprime
mortgages originated in January 2005 did not spike when the coupon reset, sug-
gesting that the default boundary is continuous in the data.
The analysis also shows that, in addition to the initial loan-to-value ratio,
the coupons before and after the reset are important determinants of the initial
yield on the mortgage. Conditional on the initial loan-to-value ratio, mortgages
with low initial payments followed by high payments after the reset have higher
equilibrium initial yield spreads than mortgages in which the increase in coupon
at the reset date is smaller. The difference in initial yield spreads reflects the fact
that that the expected loss on the former mortgage is greater than the expected
loss on the latter. It should be emphasized that this difference is not due to
changes in the ability of the borrower to make mortgage payments, which is the
channel usually emphasized by analysts. Rather the difference is due to the timing
of payments and the associated change in default probabilities, which reflects the
borrower’s unwillingness to make payments even if he had the ability to do so;
analysts often use the term “strategic default” to describe such behavior. The
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difference between the yield spreads predicted by the model is consistent with
empirical work by KLO. The authors find that adjustable-rate mortgages with
high initial loan-to-value ratios are more prone to default, and have higher initial
yield spreads, than fixed rate mortgages with the same initial loan-to-value ratio.
3.2 Benchmark Model
The model is set in continuous time. Agents discount the future at a constant
rate ρ. A house provides a stochastic flow of services. Housing services x(t) follow
a geometric Brownian motion
dx(t) = αx(t)dt+ σx(t)dw(t); (3.1)
where α is the drift parameter, σ is the volatility parameter, and w(t) is standard
Brownian motion. The drift parameter α represents the expected proportional
gain in housing services. I normalize initial housing services to one, x(0) = 1.
House prices equal the expected discounted value of future services. That is,
P (x(t)) = Et
[∫ ∞
z=t
e−ρ(z−t)x(t)dz
]
=
x(t)
ρ− α . (3.2)
The mathematical expectation Et is conditional on information available at time
t. The pricing specification (3.2) is valid if agents are risk neutral, or if housing
services follow (3.1) under the risk neutral pricing measure. The adopted speci-
fication rules out bubbles. By the Ito-Doeblin formula, house prices also follow
a geometric Brownian motion with drift parameter α and volatility parameter σ.
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Therefore the best prediction for house prices is that they grow at the constant
rate α.
Under the normalization x(0) = 1, the purchase price of a house is P (1) =
1/(ρ − α). A borrower buys the house using a mortgage loan. The difference
in the size of the mortgage loan and the purchase price is financed from the
borrower’s personal wealth, which I do not model. The mortgage contract requires
the borrower to make regular coupon payments to the lender in exchange for
the flow of services from the property. The coupon schedule is divided into two
regimes. The borrower pays the coupon c0 for the first T years. The coupon resets
and equals c1 in perpetuity thereafter. The reset date T and the coupons c0 and
c1 are exogenous. I use the term reset mortgage to refer to such contracts. When
c0 = c1, a reset mortgage corresponds to a fixed rate mortgage. When c0 < c1
the initial coupon is a teaser coupon. The initial period of low coupon payments
is the teaser period. As modeled here, a reset mortgage with a teaser coupon
is a stylized version of graduated payment, hybrid adjustable-rate, and interest-
only mortgage contracts observed in practice. As with the contracts observed
in practice, the coupon payments in a reset mortgage with a teaser coupon are
back loaded: they are low initially and then jump at a pre-specified reset date. In
Section 3.2.3 the setup here is used to study fixed rate balloon payment mortgages.
In practice, these mortgages do not amortize fully over the lifetime of the mortgage
loan. Consequently the borrower has to make a lumpsum payment when the
loan matures. Balloon payment mortgages are common in commercial real estate
transactions.
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The borrower has the option to default on his mortgage. Default is costless
for both the borrower and the lender; costly default is analyzed in Section 3.3.
The analysis assumes that the borrower can always buy the mortgage back from
the lender at its market value. This assumption corresponds in practice to the
borrower’s ability to hand over the house keys to the lender and walk away from the
mortgage. In practice, the borrower also has the option to prepay his mortgage.
Since the focus is on default, the analysis abstracts away from prepayment.
Lenders make zero expected profits, implying that the size of the mortgage
loan must equal the expected discounted value of the borrower’s payments. Since
the expected value of payments depends on the default behavior of the borrower,
the size of the mortgage is determined as part of the equilibrium. Consequently
the initial loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and the mortgage yield are also endogenous.
3.2.1 Equilibrium
The borrower takes the coupon schedule as given and chooses a default rule
that maximizes his home equity, or equivalently minimizes his mortgage liability.
The equity maximization problem is solved in two steps. First I maximize the
equity after the coupon reset. Next I take the post-reset equity as given and
maximize the equity prior to the coupon reset. Conditional on non-default till the
reset date, home equity after the coupon reset is identical to equity in a fixed rate
mortgage with coupon c1. Let F (x(t)) denote the borrower’s equity in a fixed rate
mortgage with coupon c1. Home equity after the reset is given by the formula,
F (x(t)) =
(
P (x(t))− c1
ρ
)
+
(
c1
ρ
− P (δ1)
)(
δ1
x(t)
)m
; (3.3)
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where δ1 denotes the optimal default boundary, m is the positive root of the
characteristic quadratic, and x(t) is the level of housing services at some t > T ; see
KLO and Singhania (2013) for two alternative derivations of (3.3). The expression
in (3.3) shows that home equity after the coupon reset equals the current house
price P (x(t)) minus the present value of the remaining coupon payments c1/ρ plus
the value of the default option. On default, the borrower gains the present value
of the remaining coupon payments c1/ρ and loses the house, which is worth P (δ1).
The formula for the default boundary after the coupon reset is,
δ1 =
(
m
m+ 1
)[
c1/ρ
P (1)
]
. (3.4)
The root m equals
m =
(α− σ2/2) +√(α− σ2/2)2 + 2ρσ2
σ2
.
Equation (3.4) shows that the default boundary for a fixed rate mortgage is
proportional to the ratio of present value of remaining payments and the purchase
price of the house. Since m > 0, the term m/(m + 1) is strictly less than one,
implying that it is not optimal for the borrower to default on his mortgage as soon
as the present value of total outstanding mortgage payments exceeds the purchase
price. The formula for the default boundary also highlights the importance of
distinguishing between economic value and book value of equity, which equals
the current house price minus the outstanding principal balance on the mortgage.
Default is optimal when the economic value of equity is zero, not the book value.
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It is worth noting that home equity after the coupon reset is a function of
housing services only. This is a consequence of the assumption that the mortgage
is a perpetuity after the coupon reset, implying that the present value of remain-
ing coupon payments equals c1/ρ regardless of the time elapsed since the reset,
conditional on non-default. Home equity prior to the reset, however, is a function
of both time elapsed since origination t and current value of housing services x(t).
The additional dependence on t follows from the fact that the present value of
remaining coupons, conditional on non-default, depends on time remaining until
the reset. Given c0 and c1, the remaining coupon payments close to the reset date
consist mostly of c1, whereas the remaining coupon payments for a borrower close
to the mortgage origination date consist of both c0 and c1. Prior to the reset, the
present value of remaining coupon payments is lower (higher) than c1/ρ, depend-
ing on whether c0 is lower (higher) than c1. The time remaining until the coupon
reset determines the amount by which the present value of remaining coupon pay-
ments is lower (higher) than c1/ρ, depending on whether c0 is lower (higher) than
c1.
Let E(t, x(t)) denote home equity of a borrower with a reset mortgage. The
discussion above implies E(t, x(t)) = F (x(t)) after the coupon reset, t > T . Prior
to the coupon reset, home equity satisfies the following Bellman equation,
E(t, x(t)) = max
{
0, (x(t)− c0)dt+ e−ρdtEt [E(t+ dt, x(t) + dx(t))]
}
. (3.5)
The Bellman equation shows that at each instant the borrower decides whether or
not to exercise his option to default. He continues with the mortgage as long as his
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equity is positive. The equity from continuation consists of two components: the
immediate net payoff from continuation (x(t)− c0)dt and the expected discounted
value of future equity. In the continuation region, home equity in (3.5) satisfies a
partial differential equation along with value matching and smooth pasting condi-
tions that are standard in the real options literature; see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
The value matching and smooth pasting conditions require that the level and the
slope of home equity equal zero at each point on the default boundary. There
are no known closed form solutions to this partial differential equation. I solve
for home equity numerically using the binomial tree framework of Cox, Ross, and
Rubinstein (1979); see Appendix B.2 for details. The numerical method computes
(3.5) for every node in the binomial lattice by backward induction. The optimal
default boundary at each date t, denoted δ(t), is found by looking up the largest
value of x(t) at which equity equals zero. The borrower is indifferent between
default and continuation along δ(t).
Once the home equity of the borrower is found, his mortgage liability follows:
M(t, x(t)) = P (x(t))− E(t, x(t)). (3.6)
The fact that default is costless for the lender implies that his asset value of
the mortgage equals the borrower’s mortgage liability. The zero expected profit
condition implies that the size of the mortgage loan equals its asset value. The
borrower’s equity at the time of default equals zero. Therefore, by (3.6), the
lender’s recovery on the mortgage equals the house price at the time of default.
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The mortgage yield is the discount rate at which the present value of the
remaining coupon payments equals the market value of the mortgage. It is the
value of r that solves
M(t, x(t)) =
c0
r
(
1− e−r(max{T,t}−t))+ c1
r
e−r(max{T,t}−t). (3.7)
The difference between the mortgage yield and the expected return on mortgages
ρ is the yield spread on the mortgage. The spread reflects the expected losses
from mortgage default. The initial mortgage yield is the value of r that equates
the right hand side of (3.7) to M(0, 1).
3.2.2 Numerical Example
Since closed form solutions are unavailable, I discuss the properties of the
equilibrium using numerical examples. The discount rate is ρ = 7%, implying
that the average real proportional gain on mortgages and home equity is 7%. The
parameters for the geometric Brownian motion followed by housing services are
α = 3%, and σ = 15%. Under the normalization x(0) = 1, the purchase price of a
house is P (1) = 25. The implied price-to-rent ratio in the model is 25. Price-to-
rent ratios in the data are closer to 10 or 15. This discrepancy between the model
and the data is appropriate because the model abstracts from operating costs
such as maintainence and utilities expenses. The chosen value of σ = 15% for the
standard deviation of housing services is consistent with estimates of individual
house price volatility in the literature.1 In the benchmark parametrization, the
1For example, Flavin and Yamashita (2002) estimated the standard deviation of the real
return on housing to be 14%. Similarly, Case and Shiller (1989) estimated the return on in-
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coupon resets two years from the date of mortgage origination, T = 2. The coupon
after the reset is c1 = 1.75. The chosen value of c1 corresponds to the coupon
on a fixed rate mortgage with an initial LTV ratio close to 90%. I compute
the equilibrium for various c0. Recall that the equilibrium requires the joint
computation of the default boundary and the size of the mortgage loan, such that
the borrower maximizes home equity and the lender makes zero expected profits.
First consider the case with c0 = 0. The borrower strictly prefers to continue
with the mortgage until the coupon reset because he gets a positive flow of housing
services at zero cost. In this case, I define the default boundary during the teaser
period to be zero. This definition is consistent with the discussion of the default
boundary earlier: The borrower is indifferent between default and continuation if
housing services equal zero before the coupon reset. When the mortgage coupon
resets to c1 = 1.75 the default boundary jumps to δ1 = 0.776. After the reset the
borrower defaults when housing services are less than or equal to 77.6% of the
purchase price of the house. The level of housing services at which the borrower
defaults determines the recovery. The default boundary is discontinuous at the
reset date T . Therefore the recovery on the mortgage is not known with cer-
tainty at the mortgage origination date. It can take any value within the interval
(0, P (δ1)], if the borrower defaults as soon as the coupon resets. Otherwise, if he
defaults some time after the coupon reset, then the recovery equals P (δ1) = 19.40.
The value of the mortgage at origination is its expected discounted date T value,
M(0, 1) = 19.47. The initial LTV ratio is M(0, 1)/P (1) = 77.90%. The initial
mortgage yield is 7.71%.
dividual houses to be around 14-15%. Values of σ closer to 10% maybe more appropriate for
houses located in certain geographical areas of the United States.
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It should be pointed out that the equilibrium with c0 = 0 relies heavily on the
assumption that borrowers cannot refinance their mortgage. If this assumption
was relaxed lenders might avoid contracts with c0 = 0 because borrowers are likely
to refinance when the coupon resets.
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Figure 3.1: The default boundary for various values of the initial coupon c0. The
default boundary is continuous at the reset date T when c0 is greater than δ1, the
default boundary after the coupon reset.
Now consider the case with c0 = 0.75; this value of c0 will serve as the bench-
mark for the rest of the paper. Since c0 < c1, the mortgage features a teaser
coupon. Figure 3.1 shows the default boundary as a function of time; recall that
the economic value of equity is zero along the default boundary δ(t). The figure
reiterates the importance of distinguishing between the book value and the eco-
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nomic value of equity — the borrower defaults when the economic value is zero,
not the book value. For example, at t = 1 the book value of equity is zero when
housing services equal 0.835, whereas the economic value of equity is zero when
housing services drop to 0.61. These numbers correspond to 83.5% and 61% of
the purchase price of the house, respectively. In fact the level of housing services
at which book value of equity is zero equals 0.835 for all t, whereas the level curve
at which the economic value of equity is zero changes with t.
The figure also shows that the default boundary during the teaser period is
below c0. The borrower strictly prefers to continue with the mortgage when
his immediate net payoff from the mortgage is strictly positive, x(t) − c0 > 0.
Continuation is optimal even if the immediate payoff is zero, x(t)−c0 = 0. Suppose
that the borrower adopted the following rule: default when the immediate payoff
is zero. Instead of following the rule above, the borrower could wait and observe
the realization of housing services next period. If housing services fall, he can
default. If they rise, he strictly prefers to continue because the immediate payoff
is now strictly positive. The ability to default when housing services fall implies
that the expected cost of waiting is zero. The expected benefit of waiting is strictly
positive. Therefore the borrower strictly prefers to continue when the immediate
payoff is zero, implying that the adopted default rule cannot be optimal.
If x(t) − c0 < 0 then the borrower compares the immediate net payoff of
continuing to the expected discounted value of future net payoffs. This calculation
depends on the time remaining until the coupon reset. Conditional on the level of
housing services, the net payoff on a reset mortgage is more likely to be positive
in the foreseeable future during the teaser period, when the coupon equals c0,
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than after the reset, when the coupon equals c1. Therefore the borrower is willing
to accept larger immediate losses when there is more time remaining until the
coupon reset, implying that the default boundary is increasing in t.
Conversely, the borrower is less willing to accept immediate losses as the time
remaining until the reset decreases. The default point equals δ1 at the reset date.
To prove this result, suppose that the default point is below δ1 instead. Consider
the borrower’s decision if housing services at T are between the supposed default
point and δ1. According to the supposed default rule, the borrower should continue
making his mortgage payment at this level of housing services. The continuity of
geometric Brownian motion implies that the borrower is certain to default after
the coupon reset. The immediate payoff from continuing at date T is negative
and default next period is imminent. Therefore it is optimal for the borrower to
default at date T , implying that the supposed default rule is suboptimal.
The default boundary is discontinuous at the reset date T — it jumps from
c0 = 0.75 to δ1 = 0.779. The discontinuity arises because the post-reset default
boundary is greater than the teaser coupon, δ1 > c0. It is worth emphasizing that
the jump in the default boundary at the reset date is not due to the borrower’s
inability to meet the coupon payment. It is due to his unwillingness to pay the
coupon. The former reason for default has been widely discussed. The latter
reason, however, has received little attention. Recognition of the fact that the
optimal default boundary can be discontinuous is important for studies that try
to distinguish between “strategic” and “liquidity driven” default in mortgages
with coupon resets.
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Figure 3.2: Mortgage value as a function of housing services for various t; param-
eters equal their benchmark values. The default boundary and the recovery at a
given t are also shown.
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The mortgage value at origination is M(0, 1) = 20.87. The corresponding
LTV ratio is 83.50%. Figure 3.2 shows the level curves of the mortgage value as a
function of housing services for t = 0, 1 and for t > T . The value of the mortgage
at every date is an increasing function of housing services x(t) because an increase
in x(t) today lowers the likelihood of default in the foreseeable future. The figure
also shows the house price function, P (x(t)). Optimality of default behavior at
date t requires that mortgage value equal the house price at the default point —
the value matching condition — and that the slope of the two functions at the
default point be identical — the smooth pasting condition. The figure also shows
the default point at each date t. The value of the mortgage at the default point
is the lender’s recovery on the mortgage. Prior to the reset, the recovery rate is
an increasing function of time. Since the default boundary is discontinuous at T ,
the recovery rate at this date is unknown when the mortgage is originated; it lies
in the interval [P (c0)/M(0, 1), P (δ1)/M(0, 1)] = [89.84%, 92.96%].
The initial yield on the mortgage is 7.701%. The initial yield spread of about
70 basis points reflects the expected loss on the mortgage.
Next consider the case with c0 = 1.25. Figure 3.1 shows the default boundary.
As earlier, the default boundary is an increasing function of t. Now, however, the
default boundary is continuous at the reset date T . The continuity of the default
boundary at T depends on whether the initial coupon c0 is less than or greater
than δ1, the default boundary after the reset. The reason for the discontinuity at
the reset date when c0 < δ1 was discussed earlier; the size of the discontinuity is
δ1 − c0.
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The discussion now turns to the continuity of the default boundary at T for all
c0 ≥ δ1. It proceeds by showing that neither δ(T ) < δ1 nor δ(T ) > δ1 is optimal.
Therefore δ(T ) must equal δ1, implying that the default boundary is continuous
at T .
Suppose that δ(T ) < δ1. Consider the default decision of the borrower if hous-
ing services lie in the interval (δ(T ), δ1) at date T . The continuity of geometric
Brownian motion implies that the borrower will default once the coupon resets,
almost surely. The immediate net payoff to the borrower from continuing is neg-
ative because housing services are below δ1, which is below c0. Therefore the
borrower prefers to default at date T , implying that δ(T ) < δ1 is not optimal.
Instead, suppose that δ(T ) > δ1. The continuity of geometric Brownian motion
implies that the borrower will have strictly positive equity as soon as the coupon
resets. The Taylor series expansion of the borrower’s equity after the coupon reset
shows that the supposed default rule must violate either the value matching or
the smooth pasting condition at date T ; see Appendix B.1 for details. Therefore
δ(T ) > δ1 cannot be optimal. The two arguments together imply δ(T ) = δ1.
The mortgage value at origination is M(0, 1) = 21.79. The corresponding
LTV ratio is 87.15%. The recovery rate on the mortgage increases from 79.63%
to 89.03% as t goes from 0 to T . Since the default boundary is continuous, the
recovery at the reset date is no longer unknown when the mortgage is originated.
It equals 19.40, implying a recovery rate of 89.03%. The initial yield on the
mortgage is 7.704%. The initial yield spread on the reset mortgage with c0 = 1.25
is slightly higher than the spread on the reset mortgage with c0 = 0.75.
127
Chapter 3. Default Risk and Valuation of Mortgages with Coupon Resets
When c0 = c1 = 1.75, the reset mortgage is identical to a fixed rate mortgage,
so the default boundary before and after the reset are both equal to δ1 = 0.776.
The mortgage value at origination is M(0, 1) = 22.67; initial LTV ratio is 90.69%;
recovery rate is 85.56%; and initial mortgage yield is 7.72%.
If c0 is increased further, the default boundary becomes a decreasing function
of time. Figure 3.1 shows the default boundary when c0 = 2.50. The mortgage
value is M(0, 1) = 23.89; LTV ratio is 95.54%; and initial mortgage yield is
7.78%. The recovery rate decreases from 91% to 81.21% as t goes from 0 to T .
When c0 > c1, the borrower is unwilling to bear large immediate losses close
to the mortgage origination date because the immediate payoff is likely to stay
negative in the foreseeable future when the coupon equals c0. However, as the reset
date approaches, the borrower’s willingness to accept immediate losses increases
because the drop in the coupon at the reset date increases the probability of the
payoff becoming positive in the foreseeable future. This finding is consistent with
empirical work of Fuster and Willen (2012) on payment resets. These authors
study the impact of a payment reset on the default probability of a sample of
subprime borrowers with hybrid ARMs. The borrowers in the sample experience
a drop in their mortgage coupon at reset date. Fuster and Willen find that the
default hazard starts decreasing about two months prior to the reset and continues
to do so until the reset, after which the hazard stabilizes.
Figure 3.3 shows the tradeoff between initial mortgage yield and initial LTV
ratio for reset mortgages. The LTV ratio on the mortgage was varied by increasing
the post-reset coupon, starting at c1 = 0.75. The figure shows the tradeoff for
reset mortgages with c0 = 0.75. For comparison it also shows the tradeoff for
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Figure 3.3: The tradeoff between initial yield and initial LTV ratio on reset mort-
gages and fixed rate mortgages. The LTV ratio was varied by changing c1, the
coupon payment after the reset.
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reset mortgages with c0 = 1.25 and for fixed rate mortgages; the coupon for fixed
rate mortgages also starts at 0.75. It is worth pointing out the the expected rate
of return on all of these mortgages is ρ = 7%, as a consequence of the fact that
risk neutral lenders do not require risk compensation. Consider reset mortgages
with c0 = 0.75. The figure shows that the expected loss on reset mortgages with
c0 = 0.75 is higher than the expected loss on fixed rate mortgages — for a given
LTV ratio the initial yield spread on the reset mortgage is higher. For example,
the initial yield on the reset mortgage with an initial LTV ratio of 95% is 9.02%
whereas the initial yield on a fixed rate mortgage with the same LTV is 7.96%.
The difference in initial yields is due to the differences in the schedule of coupon
payments. The coupon payments on the reset mortgage during the teaser period
are lower than the payments on the corresponding fixed rate mortgage. Since the
LTV ratios on the two mortgages are identical, the post-reset coupon on the reset
mortgage is higher than the coupon on the fixed rate mortgage.
The default boundary on the teaser mortgage is below the boundary on the
fixed rate mortgage during the teaser period, and above the boundary after the
coupon reset. For an initial LTV ratio of 95%, the default boundary on the fixed
rate mortgage is 0.836 whereas the default boundary on the teaser mortgage jumps
from 0.75 to 1.073 at the reset date. The higher initial yield on the reset mortgage,
as compared to the fixed rate mortgage, reflects the fact that the increase in default
probability due to the higher post-reset default boundary outweighs the reduction
in default probability due to the lower coupon during the teaser period.
Now consider the yield-LTV tradeoff on the reset mortgage with c0 = 1.25.
To begin with, the initial yield on this mortgage is less than the yield on the
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corresponding fixed rate mortgage. The lower initial yield reflects the fact that
the initial coupon on the reset mortgage is greater than the post-reset coupon,
c0 > c1. The two yield curves cross when c0 = c1 = 1.25. For higher values of c1,
the initial coupon on the reset mortgage is lower than the post-reset coupon; the
mortgage has a teaser payment. Therefore the initial yield on the reset mortgage
is higher than the corresponding fixed rate mortgage.
Figure 3.3 also shows the maximum loan amount the lender is willing to supply.
The maximum loan size for fixed rate mortgages is found by solving for the smallest
coupon at which the LTV ratio at origination is one. Equivalently one can find
the coupon at which the default boundary equals one, implying that the borrower
defaults at the origination date of the mortgage. The maximum coupon on fixed
rate mortgages is 2.26. Consider reset mortgages with c0 = 1.25. The maximum
loan amount for these mortgages is found by solving for the post-reset coupon c1
at which the borrower’s default point at origination equals one. The maximum
post-reset coupon equals 3.29. Reset mortgages with c0 = 0.75 do not have a well
defined maximum post-reset coupon because the default boundary prior to the
reset is below 0.75. Since housing services at origination are one, the borrower
strictly prefers to continue with the mortgage at t = 0, regardless of c1. He can
always default at the reset date if housing services are below the default boundary
at that date. Even though maximum post-reset coupon is indeterminate, the
maximum loan size and LTV ratio are still well determined. Suppose that c1 →∞
and default at the reset date is certain. In this case, the maximum loan size is
equal to the sum of the expected discounted value of the coupon payments during
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the teaser period and the expected recovery at the reset date. When c0 = 0.75
the maximum LTV ratio is 97.9%.
The analysis so far has focused on cases in which the borrower defaults at the
reset date when house prices are at some level below P (1), the purchase price of
the house. Next I present an example in which the borrower defaults at the reset
date even if house prices are above P (1). This example shows that reset mort-
gages can end up in default when house price growth, although positive, is not
high enough. Some analysts purport that many subprime mortgages underwritten
in the buildup to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 fall in this category. Consider
the reset mortgage with c0 = 0.75 and c1 = 2.42. The initial LTV ratio on this
mortgage is 95%. The default boundary after the coupon reset on this mortgage
is 1.073. The boundary is greater than one, the level of housing services at orig-
ination. Therefore the borrower defaults at the reset date even if house prices
appreciate, as long as the increase is less than 7.3%. The initial yield spread on
the mortgage is 2.02%.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show how changing the volatility parameter σ affects the
equilibrium; all other parameters equal their benchmark values, in particular c0 =
0.75 and c1 = 1.75. Figure 3.4 shows how σ affects the mortgage value at t = 1.
As in standard options theory, an increase in σ makes the default option more
valuable at each date, implying that the mortgage value decreases with σ; recall
that the lender is short the default option. The figure also shows the default points
at t = 1 for each value of σ; higher values of σ are associated with lower default
points. Figure 3.5 shows the tradeoff between initial mortgage yield and initial
LTV ratio for different values of the volatility parameter σ; the initial LTV ratio
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Figure 3.4: Mortgage value at t = 1 as a function of housing services, for various
values of the volatility parameter σ.
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Figure 3.5: The tradeoff between initial mortgage yield and initial LTV ratio,
for various values of the volatility parameter σ. The LTV ratio was varied by
changing the post-reset coupon c1.
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was varied by changing the coupon c1. The figure shows that initial mortgage
yield is an increasing function of initial LTV ratio. It also shows that, for a given
LTV ratio, the equilibrium yield on the mortgage is increasing as housing services
become more volatile.
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Figure 3.6: The tradeoff between initial mortgage yield and initial LTV as the
reset date T changes, but c0 and c1 are fixed. When T = 0 the reset mortgage
contract is identical to a fixed rate mortgage with coupon c1. When T →∞ it is
identical to a fixed rate mortgage with coupon c0.
Figure 3.6 shows how increasing the length of the teaser period, while keeping
c0 and c1 unchanged, affects the tradeoff between initial mortgage yield and initial
LTV ratio. When T = 0, the reset mortgage is identical to a fixed rate mortgage
with the coupon c1. When T →∞, the reset mortgage is identical to a fixed rate
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mortgage with coupon c0. The yield and the LTV ratio both decline monotonically
as the reset date T increases.
Figure 3.7 shows how the tradeoff between initial mortgage yield and initial
LTV ratio changes with the reset date T . Unlike figure 3.6, the figure was gen-
erated by varying the post-reset coupon c1, so as to vary initial LTV, for each
T ; the pre-reset coupon equals c0 = 0.75. The figure shows the tradeoff for
T = 2, 3, 5, 7, 10. In practice, these reset dates are common for hybrid adjustable-
rate mortgages, and interest-only mortgages. In addition to reiterating the role
of initial LTV in determining initial mortgage yield, the figure highlights the im-
portance of the coupon schedule in determining initial yield. Conditional on LTV
at origination, reset mortgages with longer teaser periods have higher equilibrium
initial yields. For example, the mortgage yield at origination on a reset mortgage
with a LTV ratio of 85% increases from 7.82% to 9.58% as the length of the teaser
period increases from 2 years to 10 years.
3.2.3 Balloon Payment Mortgage
The two-step payment structure developed for reset mortgages can also be
used to study mortgages in which the borrower pays off the principal balance on
the mortgage in lumpsum at an agreed upon date. The balloon payment may be
less than or equal to the original principal balance, depending on the rate at which
the mortgage loan amortizes. The analysis here focuses on mortgages that do not
amortize, implying that the borrower pays off the entire principal balance when
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Figure 3.7: The tradeoff between initial mortgage yield and initial LTV ratio for
various values of the reset date T . For each T the initial LTV ratio was varied by
changing the post-reset coupon c1.
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Figure 3.8: The tradeoff between initial mortgage yield and initial LTV ratio for
balloon mortgages maturing at various T . A balloon mortgage converges to a
fixed rate mortgage as T →∞.
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the mortgage matures. In practice, balloon payment mortgages are commonly
observed in commercial real estate transactions.2
Suppose that the coupon on the balloon mortgage is c0, and the maturity
date is T ; the coupon on the balloon mortgage does not reset. The borrower’s
equity maximization problem is mapped into the framework developed earlier by
noting that, conditional on survival till date T , the borrower pays back the loan
provided the value of the house at that date exceeds the size of the mortgage loan.
Therefore the default boundary at T equals the level of housing services at which
house price equals the size of the mortgage loan. The default boundary for t < T
is determined by the coupon c0. The default boundary jumps at date T if the size
of the mortgage loan is such that the default boundary at date T is less than or
equal to c0.
The lender makes zero expected profits, implying that the present value of
the borrower’s payments equals the size of the mortgage loan. The equilibrium is
found by solving for the fixed point at which the borrower maximizes equity and
the zero expected profit condition holds.
Figure 3.8 shows the tradeoff between initial yield and initial LTV ratio for
balloon payment mortgages. The figure shows the tradeoff for mortgages that
mature in 5 years, 10 years, and for fixed rate mortgages; the balloon payment
mortgage approaches a fixed rate mortgage with coupon c0 as T →∞. For a given
maturity T , the LTV ratio at origination was varied by changing the mortgage
coupon c0. Conditional on T , the initial LTV ratio and initial yield increase with
2A balloon payment mortgage that matures in 7 years is common in commercial real estate.
The mortgage usually amortizes at the same rate as a 30-year fixed rate mortgage. Therefore a
lumpsum payment is due when the mortgage matures.
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c0. The probability of default also increases with the mortgage coupon. The
probability of default on the mortgage depends upon the size of the mortgage
coupon c0 and the size of balloon payment. The former determines the default
probability before maturity, whereas the latter determines the default probability
at maturity. Conditional on the time to maturity T , increasing the mortgage
coupon increases both probabilities.
Depending on initial LTV, the initial yield on the balloon payment mortgage
may increase or decrease with time to maturity T . The effect is more pronounced
for high LTV mortgages. For high initial LTV ratios, the initial yield is decreasing
in T for two reasons: (i) borrowers in mortgages with longer maturities are willing
to accept larger losses initially in hope of a future turnaround in housing services
(ii) the positive drift term dominates for larger T , implying that house prices are
more likely to exceed the mortgage principal at the maturity date.
3.3 Costly Default
The analysis so far has assumed that default is costless for both borrowers and
lenders. In practice, however, default is costly for both parties. A borrower who
chooses to default is evicted from the property, and must bear relocation expenses.
In addition, the borrower loses access to future credit and tax benefits that come
with mortgages. Empirical research on mortgage default confirms that default is
costly. For example, the estimates of Bhutta, Dokko, and Shan (2010) suggest
that the median non-prime borrower faces default costs equal to approximately
30% of the purchase price of the house; see Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000)
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for a study involving prime borrowers.3 Moreover, the existence of mortgages with
initial LTV ratios greater than 100% in practice provides further evidence in favor
of borrower default costs.
Default is also costly for the lender. Usually there is a lag of a year or more
between the default date and the date at which the lender can reposses and sell
the property. The lender receives no coupon payments from the property during
this time period. Moreover, the lender must maintain the property until the
resale. The popular press has reported several instances of borrowers damaging
the property after defaulting on their mortgage. The lender has to bear the cost
of these repairs.
I model borrower and lender default costs as deadweight losses. This modeling
choice is motivated by the notion that mortgage default is inefficient: it is not a
costless transfer of ownership of the property from the borrower back to the lender.
The adopted model specification implies that the deadweight loss from default is
the sum of borrower and lender default costs. This approach is standard in the
mortgage default literature.
3Bhutta, Dokko, and Shan (2010) focus on first liens of purchase mortgages originating in
Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada. They restrict themselves to mortgages with a CLTV
of 100%. They use a two-step maximum likelihood estimation procedure to separate default
caused by adverse life events from strategic defaults. The median borrower walks away from his
house when the value of equity equals -62% of the current house price; where equity equals the
difference between the current house price and the principal outstanding on the mortgage. The
number reported in the text above is from Singhania (2014).
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3.3.1 Costly Borrower Default
Borrower default costs are denoted kb. The costs are proportional to the
purchase price of the property.4 Lender default costs are set to zero for now.
The presence of default costs drives a wedge between the mortgage liability of the
borrower and the asset value of the mortgage to the lender. Let Mb(t, x(t)) denote
the mortgage liability of the borrower, and M`(t, x(t)) denote the asset value of
the mortgage to the lender. The Bellman equation for the borrower maximizing
home equity Eb(t, x(t)) now becomes
Eb(t, x(t)) = max
{−kb, (x(t)− c0)dt+ e−ρdtEt [Eb(t+ dt, x(t) + dx(t))]} . (3.8)
The Bellman equation shows that the borrower defaults when the economic value
of his equity equals−kb; therefore the value matching condition requires Eb(t, δ(t)) =
−kb.
The default boundary after the coupon reset equals
δ1 =
(
m
m+ 1
)[
c1/ρ− kb
P (1)
]
. (3.9)
where m is given by (3.2.1). The default boundary after the reset is decreasing in
borrower default costs. As before, the solution to the home equity maximization
4As noted by KLO, the chosen specification does not incorporate the expected discounted
present value of default costs into the price of the house, implying that borrowers who purchase
a house with mortgages and face positive default costs will find houses overpriced. Incorporating
borrower default costs into the house price calculation requires major respecification of the model
presented here. To keep the analysis tractable, I do not modify the model to incorporate this
calculation.
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problem prior to the coupon reset is obtained numerically. The optimal default
boundary prior to the reset follows.
The asset value of the mortgage to the lender prior to the reset is calculated by
backward induction separately, taking the borrower’s default behavior as given.
The value of the mortgage to the lender after the reset date is P (x(t))− F (x(t)),
with δ1 in F (x(t)) given by (3.9). Since the lender makes zero expected profits,
the size of the mortgage loan equals its asset value at origination. The initial
mortgage yield is calculated by replacing M(0, 1) in (3.7) with M`(0, 1).
Figure 3.9 shows the tradeoff between initial yield and initial LTV for the
borrower and the lender when kb = 8. For comparison, the figure also shows the
tradeoff when default is costless. Conditional on initial LTV, costly default lowers
the initial yield. Conversely, with costly default, the borrower can obtain a larger
mortgage loan for a given coupon payment. As with fixed rate mortgages, the
effect is more pronounced for high LTV mortgages; KLO analyze costly default in
fixed rate mortgages.
The initial mortgage yield increases with the borrower’s initial LTV ratio. In
contrast, the yield-LTV curve for the lender bends backwards. An increase in
the post-reset coupon c1 increases δ1, the default boundary after the reset. An
increase in δ1 has two opposing effects: it lowers the probability of the lender
receiving c1, and it increases the expected recovery on the mortgage. The former
effect lowers the mortgage value, while the latter raises it. The backward bending
yield-LTV curve for the lender shows that the former effect outweighs the latter
when c1 is increased past 2.61. The post-reset coupon cannot be greater than
2.61 in equilibrium. If c1 exceeded this level, the borrower would insist that the
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Figure 3.9: The tradeoff between initial yield and initial LTV ratio for the borrower
and the lender, when default is costly for the borrower only. The LTV ratio was
varied by changing c1, the coupon payment after the reset.
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lender reduce the coupon; doing so would raise the size of the mortgage loan, while
reducing the probability of default. The largest equilibrium value of c1 maximizes
lender’s LTV. At this coupon, the lender’s LTV is 100.22%, the borrower’s LTV
is 117.13%, and the initial yield on the mortgage is 9.01%.
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Figure 3.10: The tradeoff between initial yield and initial LTV ratio for the bor-
rower and the lender, when default is costly for the lender only. The LTV ratio
was varied by changing c1, the coupon payment after the reset.
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3.3.2 Costly Lender Default
Lender default costs are denoted by k`. As before, costs are proportional to
the purchase price of the property. Borrower default costs are set to zero. The
borrower’s equity maximization problem is now given by (3.5). The post-reset
default boundary is given by (3.4). The lender’s value of the mortgage after the
reset is
c1
ρ
−
(
P (δ1)− k` − c1
ρ
)(
δ1
x(t)
)m
where P (δ1)− k` is the lender’s net recovery on the mortgage. His value prior to
the reset is calculated using backward induction.
Figure 3.10 shows the tradeoff between initial yield and initial LTV ratio for
the borrower and the lender, when k` = 8. For comparison the figure also shows
the tradeoff in the benchmark zero default cost case. Conditional on c0 and c1,
lender default costs do not affect the default behavior of the borrower. The lender’s
valuation of the mortgage, however, is lower than the benchmark because he must
pay k` if the borrower defaults. Therefore, given c0 and c1, the size of mortgage
loan is lower in equilibrium. Conversely, the equilibrium yield on the mortgage is
higher for a given initial LTV ratio. The lender’s yield-LTV curve with k` = 8 is
backward bending. As with borrower default costs, mortgages with the post-reset
coupon c1 greater than 2.07 are ruled out in equilibrium. When c1 = 2.07, the
lender’s LTV is 72.35%, the borrower’s LTV is 90.69%, and the initial yield on
the mortgage is 10.11%.
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3.4 Conclusion
This paper studies default in mortgages with coupon resets. It provides condi-
tions under which the optimal default boundary for these mortgages is discontin-
uous at the coupon reset date. The impact of the increase in payments on default
has been debated in policy circles. Certain analysts argue that the payment reset
leads to a jump in default probability, while others have presented empirical ev-
idence that suggests otherwise. The analysis here helps reconcile the two views.
It shows that payment resets can lead to a jump in the default probability un-
der certain conditions. When these conditions are violated, however, the default
probability is continuous at the reset date.
The analysis here also shows that, in addition to the initial loan-to-value ratio,
the structure of payments is an important determinant of expected losses due to
mortgage default even in option based models. Conditional on the initial loan-
to-value ratio, reset mortgages with teaser coupons have higher expected losses
than fixed rate mortgages. The higher expected losses on mortgages with teaser
coupons are reflected in their higher equilibrium yield spreads. This prediction of
the model seems to be substantiated by the empirical work of Krainer, LeRoy, and
O (2009). These authors find the same pattern in the data when they compare
high loan-to-value adjustable-rate mortgages to fixed rate mortgages with the
same loan-to-value ratio.
Narratives of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 purport that lenders underpriced
mortgage default risk prior to the crisis. Of course, this claim contains a consid-
erable element of hindsight. The model presented here provides a framework to
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evaluate the claim from an ex ante perspective because it connects initial yields
on reset mortgages to initial loan-to-value ratios. One can ask if a calibrated ver-
sion of the model generates yield spreads similar to those observed in the data,
under reasonable parameter values. Krainer, LeRoy, and O (2009) ask this ques-
tion for fixed rate mortgages and do not find evidence of drastic mispricing in the
data. Conducting a similar exercise for reset mortgages is an important area for
future research. In addition, the model could be extended to study the pricing
of mortgage backed securities created from reset mortgages; see Singhania (2013)
for pricing of default risk in securities created from fixed rate mortgages.
The model presented in this paper abstracted from defaults caused by adverse
life events. Empirical research on mortgage default suggests that these events
play an important role in precipitating mortgage default; see for example Elul,
Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon, and Hunt (2010) and Gerardi, Herkenhoff,
Ohanian, and Willen (2013). Adverse life events that affect a borrower’s ability
to make his mortgage payment, job loss for example, might amplify the effect of
coupon resets on mortgage default. Recent work by Campbell and Cocco (2011)
and Schelkle (2012) studies mortgage default in an environment that includes ad-
verse life events. Extending the model presented here along these lines is another
important area of future research.
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Appendix A
Pricing Default Risk in Mortgage
Backed Securities
A.1 Omitted Proofs
A.1.1 Risk-free Equilibrium: Guess and Verify
For θ ∈ [0, θ2], the senior tranche’s early recovery equals late recovery is Rsl =
Vs(0, 1)−Rse. Calculate the senior tranche’s value at the early default event, using
(2.17), as implied by the guess for cs(τe); denote the implied value by V
′
s (τe, δe).
V ′s (τe, δe) = Eτe
[∫ τl
τe
e−r(t−τe)cs(τe)dt
]
+ Eτe
[
e−r(τl−τe)Rsl
]
V ′s (τe, δe) = (Vs(0, 1)−Rse)
(
1−
(
δl
δe
)m)
+ (Vs(0, 1)−Rse)
(
δl
δe
)m
= Vs(0, 1)−Rse.
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Calculate the senior tranche’s value at origination, using the right hand side of
(2.16), as implied by the guess for cs(0) and V
′
s (τe, δe) calculated above. If the
guessed coupon schedule is an equilibrium the implied origination value should
equal Vs(0, 1), the actual value of the senior tranche at origination.
E0
[∫ τe
0
e−rtcs(0)dt
]
+ E0
[
e−rτeRse
]
+ E0
[
e−rτeV ′s (τe, δe)
]
= Vs(0, 1)(1− δme ) +Rseδme + (Vs(0, 1)−Rse)δme
= Vs(0, 1).
Thus the guessed coupon schedule is an equilibrium for θ ∈ [0, θ2]. The uniqueness
of this equilibrium was established in the body of the paper.
A.1.2 The Threshold θ3
In this subsection, we derive the expression for θ3 along with the conditions
necessary for it to lie in the interval (θ2, 1).
Implicit differentiation of (2.16) and (2.17) shows that the senior coupon at
origination cs(0) in increasing in θ. So there is a threshold θ3 such that the coupon
on the pool is inadequate for all θ > θ3. The threshold is obtained by solving
qscs(0) = cp(τe) for θ, with cs(0) given by (2.20). The calculation is outlined
below.
qscs(0) = cp(τe)
Vs(0, 1) = Rpeδ
m
e +Rplδ
m
l +
cp(τe)
r
(δme − δml ) +
cp(τe)(1− δme )
rqs
157
Appendix A. Pricing Default Risk in Mortgage Backed Securities
Add and subtract (1−δme )cp(0)/r to the right hand side and use the equilibrium
valuation formula for the pool and the definition of qs to obtain,
Vs(0, 1) = Vp(0, 1)− 1− δ
m
e
r
(
cp(0)− cp(τe)
(
1 +
Rpe
Vp(τe, δe)
))
Write Vs(0, 1) = θ3Vp(0, 1), divide both sides by Vp(0, 1), and rewrite all pool
variables in terms of the underlying mortgage variables; recall that Vp(0, 1) =
Me(1) under the normalization Me(1) = Ml(1). After some algebra, we obtain
θ3 = 1− (1− δ
m
e )ηce/r
Me(1)
(
1− cl/Ml(δe)
ce/Me(δe)
)
(A.1)
The threshold θ3 is less than one when the condition cl/Ml(δe) < ce/Me(δe) holds.
By (1.8) the leading fraction in the second term of (A.1) is less than one. So the
threshold θ3 is strictly positive when the required condition holds.
Next we verify that θ3 > θ2. By the definition of the thresholds θ2 and θ3 the
inequality θ3 > θ2 can be written as follows; recall that Vp(0, 1) = Me(1).
1− (1− δ
m
e )ηce/r
Me(1)
(
1− cl/Ml(δe)
ce/Me(δe)
)
> Rp/Vp(0, 1)
Vp(0, 1)− (1− δme )ηce/r
(
1− cl/Ml(δe)
ce/Me(δe)
)
> Rp
η(Me(1)−Me(δe)) + (1− η)(Ml(1)−Ml(δl))− (1− δme )ηce/r
(
1− cl/Ml(δe)
ce/Me(δe)
)
> 0
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Since (1− η)(Ml(1)−Ml(δl)) > 0, we only need to show that
Me(1)−Me(δe)− (1− δme )
ce
r
(
1− cl/Ml(δe)
ce/Me(δe)
)
> 0
(
Me(1)− (1− δme )
ce
r
)
−Me(δe) + (1− δme )
ce
r
cl/Ml(δe)
ce/Me(δe)
> 0
Me(δe)(δ
m
e − 1) + (1− δme )
cl/Ml(δe)
r/Me(δe)
> 0
(1− δme )
cl/Ml(δe)
r/Me(δe)
> Me(δe)(1− δme )
cl
r
> Ml(δe)
The last inequality holds by (1.8). Therefore θ3 > θ2.
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Default Risk and Valuation of
Mortgages with Coupon Resets
B.1 Omitted Proofs
In this section I show that δ(T ) > δ1 cannot be optimal. The proof is done in
discrete time; the continuous time version follows by limit operations. Consider a
time step of size ∆t. The geometric Brownian motion x(t) steps up with step size
∆h = σx
√
∆t, and steps down with step size −∆h. Suppose the current value of
housing services is x(t) = x˜. The probability of the geometric Brownian motion
taking an up step at t+ ∆t to equal x˜+ ∆h is
w =
1
2
[
1 +
α
σ
√
∆t
]
. (B.1)
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First I show that defaulting at any time t is suboptimal if the borrower has
strictly positive expected equity at t+∆t. This result needs to be proven because
the negative payoff from continuing today might exceed, in absolute value, the
discounted value of expected equity tomorrow. In that case, defaulting would be
optimal. The value of equity at time t and housing services x˜ is
E(t, x˜) =
max
{
0, (x˜− c0)∆t+ 1
1 + ρ∆t
[wE(t+ ∆t, x˜+ ∆h) + (1− w)E(t+ ∆t, x˜−∆h)]
}
The Taylor series expansion of E(t+ ∆t, x˜±∆h) around (t, x˜) is
E(t+ ∆t, x˜+ ∆h) = E(t, x˜)± Ex(t, x˜)∆h+ higher order terms (B.2)
Therefore the Taylor series expansion of Et[E(t+ ∆t, x+ ∆x)] is
Et[E(t+ ∆t, x˜+ ∆x)] = E(t, x˜) + (2w − 1)Ex(t, x˜)∆h+ higher order terms
The term 2w − 1 is greater than 0 because w > 1/2; see (B.1). If the borrower
has strictly positive equity almost surely at t + ∆t, then either E(t, x˜) > 0 or
Ex(t, x˜) > 0, implying that either the value matching condition or the smooth
pasting condition must be violated at (t, x˜). Therefore defaulting at (t, x˜) cannot
be optimal. The suboptimality of δ(T ) > δ1 follows from the continuity of housing
services, which implies that the expected value of home equity at T +∆t is strictly
positive.
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B.2 Numerical Method
We will use a binomial tree pricing model to compute the mortgage values.
Since we have closed form solutions for mortgage values at the reset date, we
can compute the mortgage value at origination using backward induction. The
detailed steps are as follows.
1. Specify parameters α, σ, ρ, T, c0, c1, kb, k`. Specify the desired time step-
size ∆t.
2. Discretize the time interval [0, T + ε] using step-size ∆t to obtain the vector
t = (0,∆t, 2∆t, . . . , T + ε). The value ε is added to T so that we can
calculate the default threshold at and near the origination date. We will
truncate the vector from [0, ε] once the calculations are done.
3. Compute the up/down step-size u = eσ
√
∆t and d = e−σ
√
∆t.
4. Compute the vector of lattice nodes at the reset date using the binomial
formula xT = (x(0)u
ndN−n) where N = (T + ε)/∆t+ 1 and n = 0, 1, · · ·N .
5. Compute the mortgage liability at every lattice node at the reset date. That
is, M(T + ε, xT i) = P (xT i)− F (xT i), where
F (x(t)) =
(
x(t)
ρ− α −
c1
ρ
)
+
(
c1
ρ
− P (δ1)− kb
)(
δ1
x(t)
)m
;
6. Note that the post-reset default threshold is
δ1 =
(
m(ρ− α)
m+ 1
)[
c1
ρ
− kb
]
.
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7. Compute the vector of lattice nodes at date t = T + ε − h∆t, where h =
1, 2, · · ·T/∆t using the binomial pricing formula xt = (x(0)undN−n) where
N = (T + ε)/∆t− h+ 1 and n = 0, 1, · · ·N .
8. Let p denote the probability of an up-step and q denote the probability of a
down-step. These probabilities are
p =
eα∆t − d
u− d
q =
u− eα∆t
u− d
9. Compute the borrower’s mortgage liability
Mb(t, xti) =
min
{
P (xti) + kb, c0∆t+ e
−ρ∆t
(
pMb(t+ ∆t, xtiu) + qMb(t+ ∆t, xtid)
)}
.
10. Calculate the borrower’s default threshold at each t from the mortgage li-
ability calculation in the previous step. The default threshold is the first
value of xti at which Mb(t, xti) = P (xti) + kb. Save the default threshold in
a vector δ(t). Note that the default threshold may not be defined for t close
to zero. This is an artifact of the binomial method, not a characteristic of
the problem. This is what necessitates the extension of the time dimension
by ε.
11. Repeat steps 9-10 until t = 0.
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12. Once we have the default threshold δ(t), we can compute the lender’s value
of the mortgage using backward induction. The lender’s value is a piecewise
function that depends on the default threshold δ(t)
M`(t, x(t)) =

P (x(t))− k` if x ≤ δ(t)
c0∆t+ e
−ρ∆t
(
pM`(t+ ∆t, xtiu) + qM`(t+ ∆t, xtid)
)
if x > δ(t)
13. Truncate the left tail of all variables from [0, ε] to get the solution from
[0, T ].
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